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FOREWORD 
I am pleased to present the Report of the First Principles Review Team. 
In August 2014, the previous Minister for Defence appointed the team to undertake the First Principles Review of 
Defence. I was asked to chair the review team comprised of Professor Robert Hill, Professor Peter Leahy, Mr Jim 
McDowell and Mr Lindsay Tanner. The membership of the review team brought together a range of perspectives and 
a wealth of experience and expertise. 
We were ably supported by Roxanne Kelley, Major General Paul Symon and their secretariat1 as well as the Boston 
Consulting Group. The Secretary, Dennis Richardson and the Chief of the Defence Force, Mark Binskin are to be 
commended for their openness, professionalism and cooperation during the course of the review. I am extremely 
pleased that a quality outcome has been delivered in a tight timeframe. 
We were tasked with ensuring that Defence is fit for purpose and is able to deliver against its strategy with the 
minimum resources necessary. Using a structured framework, we have conducted an end-to-end holistic review 
based on the outcomes required of Defence and founded on the first principles agreed by the review team. Simply 
put we sought to answer the question, what is the most effective and efficient organisation that will enable Defence to 
deliver the outcomes required of it?
Defence is an organisation with a long and deservedly proud history. Its evolutionary journey from separate single 
Service agencies into the Australian Defence Force and further into an increasingly integrated Defence Organisation 
commenced in the 1970s. This report, in our opinion, sets out the next phase of change for Defence.
Our work has been forward looking. We believe the review positions Defence to best meet the future demands on 
it. We present a sustainable and enduring business model, one that allows Defence to protect the nation and its 
interests whilst also delivering best public value. 
The recommendations are not revelations and many carry a familiarity with those coming from previous reviews. 
However, our review and its supporting analysis have led us to recommend transformational change to an 
organisation which has drifted from contemporary best practice. In combination the recommendations will change 
the structure, governance arrangements, accountabilities, processes and systems of Defence. They are designed to 
operate as a whole and will need to be implemented as such in order to be most effective. 
The combined effect is a more unified and integrated organisation that is more consistently linked to its strategy and 
clearly led by its centre. We have called this, the One Defence approach. It has four key features: 
• A stronger and more strategic centre able to provide clear direction, contestability of decision-making, along with 
enhanced organisational control of resources and monitoring of organisational performance;
• An end-to-end approach for capability development with Capability Managers having clear authority and 
accountability as sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to time and budget, supported by an integrated 
capability delivery function and subject to stronger direction setting and contestability from the centre; 
1 Members of the Secretariat are listed at Annex H.
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• Enablers that are integrated and customer-centric with greater use of cross-functional processes, particularly in 
regional locations; and
• A planned and professional workforce with a strong performance management culture at its core. 
Effective implementation is essential to achieving the One Defence model and to generating the efficiencies the 
review has identified. A high level implementation plan has also been developed. Successful delivery of the review’s 
intent will require a unified leadership team willing to drive change and a behavioural shift; a sense of urgency and a 
willingness to push the pace of change; and sufficient planning, oversight and commitment to delivering the full intent 
of recommendations. As the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force are recently appointed to their roles, this 
provides a good starting point for the implementation of our recommendations.
The One Defence transformation is an opportunity for Defence to establish better relationships with the Government, 
Ministers, external stakeholders, central agencies, its own leadership and workforce. It is an opportunity for 
Defence to reset its reputation and re-position itself as a truly integrated agency that consistently produces the best 
public value, and is able to meet the current and future demands on it. Most importantly, it will allow Defence to 
effectively deliver on its primary focus: to protect and advance Australia’s strategic interests through the provision of 
appropriately prepared and equipped armed forces.
David Peever
Chair 
First Principles Review of Defence
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
This review of Defence from first principles has shown that a holistic, fully integrated One Defence system is 
essential if Defence is to deliver on its mission in the most effective and efficient way. 
In order to create One Defence and give effect to our first principles, we recommend Defence:
1. Establish a strong, strategic centre to strengthen accountability and top level decision-making
2. Establish a single end-to-end capability development function within the Department to maximise the efficient, 
effective and professional delivery of military capability
3. Fully implement an enterprise approach to the delivery of corporate and military enabling services to maximise 
their effectiveness and efficiency
4. Ensure committed people with the right skills are in appropriate jobs to create the One Defence workforce
5. Manage staff resources to deliver optimal use of funds and maximise efficiencies
6. Commence implementation immediately with the changes required to deliver One Defence in place within  
two years
We have also outlined 70 specific recommendations which detail the actions required to deliver these key 
recommendations. 
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First PrinciPles review recommendations
1. establish a strong strategic centre to strengthen 
accountability and toP level decision-making
2. establish a single end-to-end caPability develoPment Function 
within the dePartment to maximise the eFFicient, eFFective and 
ProFessional delivery oF military caPability
3. Fully imPlement an enterPrise aPProach to the delivery oF 
corPorate and military enabling services to maximise their 
eFFectiveness and eFFiciency
We recommend:
1.1 this review be adopted as the road map for Defence reform for the next five years
1.2 a new One Defence business model
1.3 the diarchy is retained
1.4 the individual and shared accountabilities of the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force be      
clarified, formally documented and promulgated through the organisation
1.5 a streamlined top level management structure for the Department that is aligned with the  
One Defence business model
1.6 the strategic centre include the Associate Secretary and Vice Chief of the Defence Force as the 
integrators for the Defence enterprise and the future force and joint capabilities respectively
1.7 the Vice Chief of the Defence Force’s decision rights be greatly strengthened, including the right to 
stop projects proceeding through the approval process until joint force integration is proven
1.8 legislative changes to formally recognise the authority of the Chief of the Defence and the Vice Chief 
of the Defence Force, including removing the statutory authority of the Service Chiefs
1.9 that policy advice be strengthened by bringing all policy functions into one organisational unit in 
order to improve the quality of advice provided to Government
1.10 a strong and credible internal contestability function be built and led by the Deputy Secretary 
Policy and Intelligence with responsibility for strategic contestability, scope, technical and cost 
contestability
1.11 that the policy and intelligence functions be combined under a Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence, who will have responsibility for providing policy advice and intelligence assessments to 
the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force
1.12 the Defence Security Authority be repositioned under the Associate Secretary
1.13 the Defence Committee be re-positioned as the primary decision making committee of Defence 
and the heart of the strategic centre with two supporting committees – Enterprise Business 
Committee and Investment Committee
1.14 that all other enterprise-wide committees be reviewed for their relevance and alignment with the  
One Defence business model with the aim of a substantial reduction in the number of committees
1.15 that the organisational structure reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force be simplified 
through the incorporation of a two-star Head of Joint Enablers role
1.16 a strengthened centre-led, enterprise-wide planning and performance monitoring process be adopted
1.17 that the Associate Secretary be the central authority to deliver enterprise planning and performance 
monitoring processes, in line with the requirements of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013
1.18 that the Minister for Defence meet with the Defence Committee twice yearly to consider a formal 
strategic assessment of the alignment between Defence’s strategy, funding and capability  
1.19  Defence conduct regular reviews of the capital program in consultation with the Minister and 
central agencies 
We recommend:
2.1 disbanding the Capability Development Group and dispersing its functions to more appropriate areas
2.2 disbanding the Defence Materiel Organisation and transferring its core responsibilities in relation to 
capability delivery to a new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
2.3 developing a new organisational design and structure as part of the implementation process for the 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group with reduced management layers  
2.4 examining each System Program Office to determine where each fits within the smart buyer function, the 
most appropriate procurement model and achieving value for money 
2.5 the Capability Managers specify the Fundamental Inputs to Capability requirements with the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group having responsibility for developing and delivering an integrated project 
plan
2.6 the accountability for requirements setting and management be transferred to the Vice Chief of the 
Defence Force and the Service Chiefs with strategic, financial and technical contestability being located 
with Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence
2.7 that the Independent Project Performance Office and the Capability Investment and Resources Division be 
relocated to Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence, significantly enhanced and strengthened to provide 
such contest 
2.8 revising the Defence investment approval process for all large or complex capability projects
2.9 introducing a new formal gate into the process at entry point - Gate Zero: Investment Portfolio entry 
2.10 Government increase approval thresholds for capability development projects, with ministerial approval 
required only for projects above $20 million, two ministers above $100 million and Cabinet above $250 
million
2.11 significant investment to develop an operational framework which comprehensively explains how the 
organisation operates and the roles and responsibilities within it; detailing the life cycle management 
processes which provide project and engineering discipline to manage complex materiel procurement 
from initiation to disposal; and reviewing architecture to reinforce accountability at all levels and bringing 
together information upon which good management decisions can be made
2.12 the Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment must sign off and assure the Secretary of the 
operational output of each of his/her divisions every quarter and on major contracts on a monthly basis
2.13 the use of net personnel operating costs process cease immediately 
2.14 developing a Defence Investment Plan which would include all capital and related investments (such as 
materiel, estate and facilities, workforce and information and communications technology)  
2.15 that, on Government approval, the entire project acquisition budget is allocated to the Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group to ensure expenditure is in accordance with the project delivery plan
2.16 the Defence Science and Technology Organisation be required to clearly articulate its value proposition. 
This would include examples and actual amounts of value created
2.17 the Defence Science and Technology Organisation become part of the Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group
2.18 the Defence Science and Technology Organisation senior leadership be rationalised
2.19 the Defence Science and Technology Organisation strengthen partnerships with academic and research 
institutions to leverage knowledge and create pathways with academia and industry
2.20 disbanding the Defence Science and Technology Organisation advisory board
2.21 Defence, in partnership with academia and industry, review its research priorities, their alignment with 
future force requirements and capacity to leverage allied partners to promote innovation
We recommend:
3.1 Defence define the estate need as determined by future force requirements and Government agree 
to dispose of all unnecessary estate holdings starting with the 17 bases identified in the 2012 Future 
Defence Estate Report
3.2 Defence strengthen its capability to present options to Government for estate disposal including obtaining 
expert external advice as required
3.3 the Government amend the Public Works Act 1969 to set a $75 million threshold for referring proposed 
works to the Public Works Committee, and re-consider recent adjustments to the 2015-16 Budget 
operational rules that run counter to more efficiently managing investment spending
3.4 the Associate Secretary be directed and resourced to implement enterprise information management that 
provides Defence with trusted information to inform decision-making and military interoperability, with the 
Vice Chief of the Defence Force as the design authority for the next generation of Command, Control, 
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
3.5 the information management agenda be governed at the Band 3/3 Star level by the Enterprise Business 
Committee to set overall direction and priorities, including the management of trade-offs and conflicts
3.6 supporting the Chief Information Officer to meet these responsibilities by formally recognising the Chief 
Technology Officer as the technical authority with appropriate ‘red card’ decision rights
3.7 Defence establish enterprise-wide frameworks for architecture standards and master data management
3.8 Defence embark on a pragmatic implementation road map to standardise business and information 
processes and their supporting applications
3.9 Defence ensure adequate resourcing and funding for information management reform is prioritised as part 
of the fully costed 2015 Defence White Paper
3.10 geospatial information functions be consolidated into the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation 
following improved resourcing and connectivity
3.11 the service delivery reform program, including full integration of the current Defence Materiel Organisation 
corporate functions, be completed
3.12 all corporate services (with the exception of finance but including the Defence Security Authority) be 
consolidated under the Associate Secretary 
3.13 all military enabling services (Joint Logistics Command Policy, Joint Health Command, Australian Defence 
College, Australian Civil-Military Centre) be consolidated under a Two-Star officer who reports to the Vice 
Chief of the Defence Force
4. ensure committed PeoPle with the right skills are in 
aPProPriate jobs to create  the One Defence workForce
5. manage staFF resources to deliver oPtimal use oF Funds and 
maximise eFFiciencies 
6. commence imPlementation immediately with the changes 
required to deliver One Defence in Place within two years
We recommend:
4.1 that as part of the budget and planning process, Defence build a strategic workforce plan for the enabling 
functions, and incorporate workforce plans for each job family in order to drive recruitment, learning and 
development, performance and talent management
4.2 Defence employ Australian Defence Force personnel in non-Service roles only when it is critical to achieving 
capability and for a minimum of three years to achieve best value-for-money from the premium paid
4.3 as many functions as possible be performed by public servants or outsourced if they are transactional  
in nature
4.4 Defence review the entirety of its enabling and military corporate workforce to ensure that it supports 
the Australian Defence Force with the minimum of overlap and redundancy, and with the greatest overall 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness
4.5 Defence reduce organisational layers; increase the spans of control of managers; align workforce 
standards in accord with the requirements of the Australian Public Service Commission; and engage 
external assistance to facilitate this work as required
4.6 Defence implement a transparent performance management system that is consistently applied, 
recognises and rewards high performance and introduces consequences for underperformance and 
failure to deal with it
4.7 as part of the performance management system, Defence take steps to create a culture where 
leadership, professionalism and corporate behaviour are valued and rewarded
We recommend:
5.1 the use of the measures such as the teeth-to-tail ratio and the one third budget split should cease
5.2 appropriate efficiency measures are developed which link to the delivery of agreed outcomes  
5.3 the focus on public service reductions as the primary efficiency mechanism for Defence cease  
5.4 Defence manage its workforce numbers in line with good resource management practice where 
Defence is held to account for delivering on required outcomes within available resourcing
5.5 as part of the implementation process, Defence examine the headquarters functions for opportunities to 
achieve more effective and efficient arrangements
We recommend:
6.1 no additional reviews on the organisational issues covered by this Review are imposed on Defence, 
particularly within the early years of implementation
6.2 past reviews and current reform initiatives should be assessed for currency and alignment to the  
One Defence model
6.3 establishing an Oversight Board to provide close external scrutiny, advice on implementation progress 
and regular reports to the Minister
6.4 the Minister, with input from the Department and the Oversight Board, report progress on 
implementation to the Government in March 2016 and March 2017
6.5 stability in the key leadership positions, particularly over the next two years to provide consistency of 
direction and ownership of the change
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One Defence 
Case for Change
The First Principles Review of Defence was commissioned by the then Minister for Defence in August 2014 following 
the Government’s 2013 election commitment. We were tasked with ensuring that Defence is fit for purpose and is 
able to deliver against its strategy with the minimum resources necessary. The Terms of Reference for the review are  
at Annex A.2
Approach
We have taken a total systems approach based on evidence and analysis, sound principles and root causes rather 
than symptoms. 
Our framework for the review (see Annex B) ensured we addressed the Terms of Reference in a manner which 
focused on the entire Defence system, interacting with the broader government, business and community systems. 
We have conducted an end-to-end holistic review based on the outcomes required of Defence and founded on the 
first principles agreed by the review team (see Diagram 1).
Diagram 1: First Principles
DEFENCE OuTCOME FIRST PRINCIPLES
Protect and advance Australia’s 
strategic interests through 
the provision of appropriately 
prepared and equipped armed 
forces. To achieve this, Defence 
prepares for and conducts 
military operations and other 
tasks as directed by the 
Government.3 
 ☞Clear authorities and accountabilities that align with resources
 ➣ Decision-makers are empowered and held responsible for delivering on strategies and plans 
within agreed resourcing
 ☞Outcome orientation
 ➣ Delivering what is required with processes, systems and tools being the ‘means not the end’
 ☞ Simplicity
 ➣ Eliminating complicated and unnecessary structures, processes, systems and tools
 ☞ Focus on core business
 ➣ Defence doing only for itself what no one else can do more effectively and efficiently
 ☞ Professionalism
 ➣ Committed people with the right skills in appropriate jobs 
 ☞ Timely, contestable advice
 ➣ Using internal and external expertise to provide the best advice so that the outcome is delivered 
in the most cost-effective and efficient manner
 ☞ Transparency
 ➣ Honest and open behaviour which enables others to know exactly what Defence is doing  
and why
3
We considered the enduring tasks of Defence whilst recognising the changing future context that Defence will need 
to operate within. Then through the lens of the first principles we considered what is required to fulfil these  
responsibilities. We have focused specifically on the areas of: direction setting and control; provision of policy advice 
and intelligence; capability development, acquisition and sustainment; and the key enablers (information  
management, estate, service delivery and the workforce). We have conducted wide-ranging interviews with  
stakeholders and have been supported by the Boston Consulting Group and a small departmental secretariat.
2 Annex A also includes the review recommendations aligned with the Terms of Reference and National Commission of Audit Defence 
recommendations.
3 Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements 2014 - 15, Budget Related Paper no. 1.4A, 2014, p. 15, available at  
<www.defence.gov.au/budget/14–15/PBS.asp>.
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Why another review?
Since the 1973 Tange Review, there have been over 35 significant reviews and many more supplementary reviews of 
Defence (see Annex C).4 The sheer frequency of reviews over the past decade has meant that many were short-lived 
or simply overtaken by the next review. Often the recommended changes were not allowed to bed in before another 
review began.
Despite this, Defence has implemented significant changes and improvements since the 1990s, for example, 
recommendations associated with the Kinnaird, Mortimer, Coles and Rizzo reviews along with the Pathway to Change 
initiatives. Compared to a decade ago, Defence has better governance and greater transparency. It has delivered on 
some difficult efficiency targets and has a more capable Australian Defence Force and Defence system generally.
Defence has a long history of effectively delivering militarily for Australia but faces great challenges over the next 
ten to twenty years. It must deliver a significant capability modernisation program against a backdrop of strategic 
uncertainty including, but not limited to: rapid technological change; budget uncertainty; substantial economic growth 
in our region; and increasing demand for military responses to various regional and expeditionary crises.
Notwithstanding previous reviews and reforms, both the Government and senior leaders in Defence recognise that 
the organisation needs to work much more effectively and that Defence in its current form is not best organised to 
meet these challenges. This is the focus of our review.
The problem
There is general agreement about the nature of the problem.5 The current organisational model and processes are 
complicated, slow and inefficient in an environment which requires simplicity, greater agility and timely delivery. Waste, 
inefficiency and rework are palpable. 
Defence is suffering from a proliferation of structures, processes and systems with unclear accountabilities. These in 
turn cause institutionalised waste, delayed decisions, flawed execution, duplication, a change-resistant bureaucracy, 
over-escalation of issues for decision and low engagement levels amongst employees.
Previous reviews and interviews with stakeholders indicate Defence operates as a loose federation where the 
individual parts from the highest levels, then down and across the organisation, are strongly protective of their turf 
and see themselves meriting more favour than other parts of the department. The centre is weak and not  
sufficiently strategic.
The problem is illustrated by the following examples:
• The number of senior leaders has nearly doubled, growing from 201 in 1998 to 374 in 2014 (an 86 per cent 
increase), while the total number of other staff has risen from around 73,000 to 78,000 (an increase of seven per 
cent - see Annex D); 
• There are around 200 active committees in the organisation; 
• There are up to twelve layers in some parts of the organisational structure against good practice of around seven;6 
• Eighty per cent of managers supervise less than five staff with sixty per cent of these supervising either one or two 
staff members. Good practice would see managers supervising between five and eight staff;7 
4 The significant reviews are listed in Annex C, along with a summary of recurring themes in capability development and a timeline of reviews 
since 1973.
5 We formed our views following interviews with stakeholders and consideration of a range of recent reports to Parliament by its Committees and 
by the Australian National Audit Office.
6 From briefing material provided by the Australian Public Service Commission to the Secretaries’ Board, October 2014, and the  
Boston Consulting Group, augmented with analysis of Defence personnel data.
7 ibid. 
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• Capability development is a series of hand-off points between different parts of the organisation involving around 
7000 Defence staff spread across seven organisational units: the three Services, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Capability Development Group and Defence Materiel Organisation;
• The setting of needs and requirements is poor with priority given to single Service needs over joint projects. While 
16 per cent of major capital equipment funding has been allocated to joint projects, actual expenditure is between 
four and nine per cent demonstrating that less priority is given to joint projects;8 
• Costing methodology does not account for all of the inputs to capability, at acquisition and over project life, and 
the true total cost of ownership is opaque;9 
• Project approval processes are lengthy and expensive. The average government submission is 70 pages long, 
takes 16 weeks to move through the Cabinet preparation process and an average of 46 months to progress from 
first pass initiation through to second pass approval;10 
• Acquisition teams must comply with over 10,000 Defence Materiel Organisation specific policies and procedures which 
includes 35 policy and procedure artefacts totalling around 12,500 pages on procurement processes and controls;11 
• There is a ‘one size fits all’ approach to procurement strategy that inhibits strategic engagement with industry;12
• Defence has a larger estate footprint than it needs because of significant internal and external blockages to 
removing redundant parts of the estate; and
• Duplicated systems and processes reflect entrenched resistance to implementing businesslike approaches such 
as shared corporate services and the empowerment of single accountable officers in areas such as information 
management. According to the Chief Information Officer, Defence has over 2500 information and communication 
management applications including 300 financial applications.
Previous review themes
Previous reviews, more frequent since 1997, have resulted in only incremental change. Whilst these reviews have 
been specific rather than holistic or have occurred in response to specific events, they have nevertheless identified 
some consistent and recurring themes:13 
• Requirement for greater clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defence, the  
Chief of the Defence Force, the Service Chiefs and the organisation; 
• Ongoing issues with the relationship between the Services and the supporting/enabling elements of the  
Defence organisation;
• Recurring issues with a lack of accountability, ill-defined authority, unclear allocation of responsibility and great 
difficulty measuring and monitoring real performance;
• Difficulty in balancing in-house service provision with industry support and services purchased externally;
• The requirement for fundamental and sustained changes in attitude and culture across all arms of the organisation; 
and
• The persistence of fundamental problems in the Defence capability system, from capability planning to acquisition, 
delivery and finally sustainment.
8 Advice from Chief of Capability Development Group based on programming analysis over 40 years.
9 Australian National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 2013–14, p. 17; Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report no.6 2013–14,  
Capability Development Reform, October 2013, pp 177-197. These reports are available at < http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports >.
10 Analysis of project approval data provided by Capability Investment and Resources Division.
11 The suites of documentation include inventory procurement policy, risk environment assessment policies, and Defence Materiel Organisation guidance.
12 Advice from industry and government stakeholders.
13 The significant reviews are listed in Annex C along with a summary of recurring themes in capability development and a timeline of reviews since 1973.
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These concerns have also been widely acknowledged by external observers and commentators, including the 
Parliament, the Australian National Audit Office and the broader academic and professional community. They were 
echoed throughout our extensive engagement with individuals and organisations as part of the review process. 
Resistance to change
These recurring themes and the continuing need for external review are symptomatic of an organisational culture 
within Defence that is risk-averse and resistant to change. 
Reform of the capability development process is a pertinent example. The persistent message is that reform intent 
is subsumed by box-ticking and process tinkering. The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee in its report on procurement procedures in Defence observed:
Defence’s responses to the evident failings in their procurement projects have tended to focus on 
process. The committee is concerned, however, that such measures merely promote form over 
substance and it remains to be convinced that in practice they are effective. In the Committee’s view, 
Defence have been tinkering at the margins of the problem, giving the impression that by improving 
process, the desired change in behaviour will follow. The Committee believes that such an approach 
only serves to mask fundamental weakness in the overall management structure of Defence and its 
major acquisition programs.14 
Defence reported to Parliament that major reforms to buying military equipment proposed by David Mortimer in 2008 had 
been implemented. In 2013 the Auditor-General found that many of these recommended reforms had been implemented 
by ‘process’ rather than ‘outcome’, with Parliament none the wiser.15 Defence had added veneers of process, papered 
over the concerns of reviewers and the findings of auditors, and avoided fixing the underlying problems. 
Concerns expressed by a number of external stakeholders to the review team consistently portrayed Defence as 
inward-looking, complicated and difficult to manage. A number of previous ministers and heads of central agencies 
also commented on Defence’s lack of transparency, propensity for obfuscation and willingness to ‘game the system’ 
for its own advantage. 
Playing the reform game, rather than delivering on the intent, has meant that Defence is not seen as transparent 
by central agencies, creating a lack of trust in decision-making. This in turn leads these agencies to engage at a 
more tactical level to constrain Defence. Unfortunately, these agencies often do not have a sufficiently detailed 
understanding of Defence, which means their attempts to defray risk result in additional processes which add to 
inefficiency and waste.
Root Causes
We acknowledge the complex and difficult tasks expected of Defence, particularly in making investment decisions 
with a 30 to 40 year tail. Yet we were puzzled as to why Defence has been unable to reform itself. Organisations need 
to be periodically reset and reshaped by their leadership. Substantive change appears to have been too difficult for 
Defence leaders because of the root causes listed over the page. 
14 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects: Final Report, August 
2012, pp. 250–251, available at  
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/completed-inquiries/2010-13/procurement/index>. 
15 Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no. 6 2013–14, Capability Development Reform, October 2013, pp. 273–287, 
available at <www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports>.
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In seeking to determine what has prevented Defence from changing, we noted three root causes which over the past 
decade have created complacency and inertia: 
• The high operational tempo and increasing national security demands over the past decade have demanded high 
levels of the senior leadership’s time and attention;
• Budget uncertainty with $18.2 billion removed from the Defence budget from 2009–10 onwards which has led to 
reactive planning, deferred military capability and a hollowing out of enablers such as estate and information and 
communications technology; and
• Leadership churn from 1998 to the present resulting in nine ministers with an average tenure of two years, six 
Secretaries with an average tenure of two and a half years and five Chiefs of the Defence Force with an average 
tenure of four years.
We note the Government has acknowledged the budget uncertainty issue and that it aspires to increase Defence 
spending to two per cent of Gross Domestic Product. We also note that the life of this review extends beyond the 
current economic cycle. It is therefore prudent to assume that Defence expenditure may again come under pressure. 
In any event, the current waste and inefficiency will continue if Defence remains in its current form, as it is neither 
equipped nor organised to make efficient use of whatever funding levels are available to it. 
Leadership churn and budget uncertainty are the critical root causes of the organisation’s complacency. The frequent 
turnover in Ministers and Secretaries, in particular, does not enable effective leadership of change. The state of the 
organisation is symptomatic of one that has not been materially reshaped for over a decade and has been allowed to drift.
Delivering value
Defence is obliged to produce the military capability required to achieve its mission in a transparent, accountable and 
efficient manner. In so doing, it is also obliged to deliver the highest levels of public value.16 
Ongoing drift and complacency, with or without increased funding, creates risk and opportunity costs for Defence 
and the Government. Defence capability will not be optimally delivered and wastage will mean less funding available 
for other priorities. 
Defence cannot continue as it is. The time is right to clear the decks and liberate the organisation for the future. It 
must transform itself in order to deliver the required public value. 
Direction 
This is the third holistic, end-to-end review of Defence since Tange in 1973 and the Defence Efficiency Review in 
1997.17 We have reviewed Defence’s structures, systems and processes and concluded that it is imperative that 
Defence evolves into a single, integrated system. 
Defence must become one end-to-end organisation, not a federation of separate parts, if it is to effectively 
and efficiently deliver the required outcomes. Joint capability — the ability to coordinate across land, air, sea, 
intelligence and other domains to deliver joint effects — is increasingly important to the war fighter. It is essential to 
prioritise investment in corporate and military enablers (such as information and communications technology) and 
professionalise the workforce.
We are recommending transformational change which will reshape the way Defence does business. 
Our proposed end-to-end changes will enable Defence to operate as one integrated system to meet the challenges 
16 Mark H. Moore, Creating Public Value — Strategic Management in Government, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2002.
17 Sir Arthur Tange, Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments, (hereafter the Tange Review), 
Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973; and Department of Defence, Defence Efficiency Review, Canberra,1997.
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of the future and deliver on its outcome in a more effective and efficient manner. We have termed this the One 
Defence approach.
Our recommendations for creating One Defence are a package which should be implemented in their entirety 
rather than cherry-picked and selectively modified. They represent transformational change because they entail 
organisation-wide structural, system and process changes combined with a requirement for a significant shift in 
business culture (mindset and behaviours) and discernible shifts in power.18 
We recommend that this review be adopted as the road map for Defence reform for the next five years.
First class implementation is critical to the success of these reforms. It will require substantial drive, determination, 
endurance, focus from leadership and in some cases significant investment. 
We have therefore recommended not just ‘what’ should change but also ‘how’ the change should be implemented. 
Success will only happen with strong, clear, wise and uncompromising leadership from the top (both public service 
and military) supported by an energetic, committed and able senior leadership team. Given the history of reform in 
Defence we also feel that this process will benefit from external scrutiny for an extended period of time. 
One Defence Business Model
Implementing the One Defence approach will require changes to accountabilities, structures, systems and 
processes. More importantly, it will require changes to behavioural mindsets with clearly understood expectations 
that in delivering Defence outputs, leaders are focused on the corporate good and what is best for Defence overall. 
It will involve power and authority changes with the centre becoming much stronger than the individual parts but with 
an organisation more empowered to execute the direction set by the centre. It will also have stronger ‘checks and 
balances’ to ensure leaders are delivering on their commitments within agreed timeframes and budgets.
Defence’s current business model is a mixture of functions and structures. 
Diagram 2: Defence’s current business model
18 David Miller, ‘Delivering Transformational Change’, The European Business Review, March 2012.
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In accordance with our first principles of simplicity and focus on core business, we have simplified the business model 
and designed the new model based on the functions required in the One Defence approach. It has three key features:
• A stronger and more strategic centre able to provide clear direction, contestability of decision-making, as well 
as enhanced control of resources and monitoring of organisational performance (refer Chapter 2);
• An end-to-end approach for capability development with Capability Managers assigned clear authority 
and accountability as sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to schedule and budget, supported by an 
integrated capability delivery function and subject to stronger direction setting and contestability from the centre 
(refer Chapter 3); and
• Enablers that are integrated and customer-centric with greater use of cross-functional processes, particularly 
in regional locations (refer Chapter 4). 
We recommend a new One Defence business model:
Diagram 3: Proposed One Defence business model
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One Defence 
A Strong, Strategic Centre
2
Key Recommendation 1
Establish a strong, strategic centre to strengthen accountability and 
top level decision-making
The size and complexity of the Defence task requires a degree of decentralisation and autonomy within the three 
Services and other large organisational units. However the current organisation has too many voices to be effective. 
It lacks clear, single points of accountability for outcomes, is more focused on detail than alignment with policy or 
strategy, and rewards federated rather than enterprise behaviour.
Our recommendations for establishing the strong, strategic centre outline the roles and responsibilities of the diarchy19 
and the top decision-making team. They also describe the committee structure required for effective decision-making 
and the planning and performance framework required to embed transparent and accountable corporate behaviour.
The strong strategic centre
Establishing a strong, strategic centre to set direction, provide contestability and ensure organisational control is 
consistent with our first principles and underpins One Defence. Current power and authority will shift to achieve more 
effective joint outcomes with empowered responsibility and activity in the service delivery and enabling functions. 
The strategic centre will comprise the Secretary, Chief of the Defence Force, Associate Secretary, Vice Chief of the 
Defence Force, a new position of Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence, and the Chief Finance Officer. This group 
will form the new Defence Committee. The current Defence Committee of seventeen members is too large and 
unwieldy to function as an effective strategic centre.
The Diarchy
The diarchy is an unusual leadership construct that does not necessarily align with our first principles of clear 
authorities, accountabilities and simplicity. However, given the dual nature of the Defence organisation, which requires 
both military and public sector expertise, we recommend the diarchy be retained. 
The diarchy maximises the value of public sector and military culture, skills and experience. It also provides the 
contestability of advice to Government which is required given Defence’s two key outputs of joint warfighting and 
policy advice. 
The current division of accountabilities between the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force has not been 
updated since the Ministerial Directive of 2007. We have noted the Commission of Audit’s recommendation regarding 
the responsibilities of the diarchy.20 We also received feedback from internal stakeholders about duplication of effort 
between the public service and military functions of Defence and consequent opacity around accountability at all 
levels in the organisation.
19 The diarchy is the term used to describe the dual leadership of the Australian Defence Organisation by the Secretary of the Department of 
Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force, enacted through legislation and subject to ministerial direction.
20 See recommendation 24(d) in National Commission of Audit, Towards Responsible Government — The Report of the National Commission of 
Audit: Phase One, February 2014, p. xlvi, available at <www.ncoa.gov.au>.
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To increase effectiveness, minimise duplication and simplify reporting lines, we recommend that the individual and 
shared accountabilities of the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force be clarified, formally documented 
and promulgated throughout the organisation.
More specifically, the shared accountabilities of the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force should be reduced 
to the highest level functions of the Department with individual accountabilities as follows:
• The Chief of the Defence Force commands the Australian Defence Force and is responsible for advising the 
Government on the deployment of the Australian Defence Force to achieve the Government’s objectives. The 
Secretary has primary accountability for the provision of advice to Government, including for the policy aspects of 
operational deployments; 
• The Secretary is responsible for managing the portfolio budget and plans to meet Government objectives, building 
on the force structure options developed by the Chief of the Defence Force;
• The Chief of the Defence Force is responsible for delivering capability and preparedness outcomes within schedule 
and budget, while the Secretary is responsible for providing the enablers; and
• The Secretary has ultimate responsibility for ensuring the sound management of financial and other resources, 
including setting and managing organisational budgets and overall investment management.
Maintaining the diarchy and the inevitable sharing of some accountabilities is not an excuse, however, for failing to 
ensure that the organisation operates as a integrated entity, nor should it weaken the individual accountabilities set 
out in Diagram 4.
Diagram 4: Diarchy accountabilities
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One Defence Senior Leadership
Delivering One Defence requires a senior leadership structure that is able to harness distinct military and public 
sector culture and skills. We recommend a streamlined top level management structure for the Department 
that is aligned with the One Defence business model (see Diagram 5). 
Diagram 5: Proposed Layer 1 and 2 Organisational Chart 
In the new structure the Secretary has four direct reports at Senior Executive Service Band 3 level:
• An Associate Secretary responsible for enterprise planning, performance and risk management and the 
integration of corporate enabling services; 
• A new Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence responsible for policy, contestability and intelligence. This 
position incorporates the strategy, policy and contestability functions of Strategy Group, Capability Development 
Group and the Defence Material Organisation as well as the three Defence intelligence agencies;
• The Chief Finance Officer responsible for financial control and assurance; and
• A new Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment role responsible for smart procurement 
of Defence capability and being the delivery agent for the Capability Managers. It incorporates functions from 
Capability Development Group, Defence Materiel Organisation, logistics service delivery, non-materiel procurement 
and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. The Chief Defence Scientist role would be retained as a 
Band 3 reporting to the Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment. 
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The Chief of the Defence Force has five direct military reports at the 3 star level:
• Vice Chief of the Defence Force as the joint capability authority with responsibility to champion joint capabilities 
and future force design (including preparedness settings and military strategy) and integrator of military enabling 
services (such as joint logistics policy, joint health, joint education);
• Service Chiefs for Navy, Army and Air Force retain their existing responsibility to raise, train and sustain 
capability as Capability Managers. As the Capability Development Group would be abolished, the service specific 
capability needs and requirements functions would transfer to the individual Services21 to support a stronger 
capability sponsor role. The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group would become responsible for 
delivering on their requirements; and
• The Chief of Joint Operations would retain responsibility for the conduct of joint operations.
Roles in the Strategic Centre
Integrators: Associate Secretary and Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Given the important roles the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force have in managing the external 
environment (upwards and outwards), it is important for the organisation to have integrators who bring others 
together, make trade-offs and drive cooperation to create joint outputs.22 
Integration is a central issue for the One Defence business model as it seeks to deliver the joint and future force 
more effectively as well as drive greater integration of the enabling functions. This will require prioritisation and trade-
off decisions particularly across different capability areas.
In line with the Black Review of 2011,23 the review team considers that integrators, at the second level of the 
organisation, supporting both the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force, are required for effective 
management in a diarchal organisation and to implement the One Defence system. 
We recommend that the strategic centre include the Associate Secretary and Vice Chief of the Defence 
Force as the integrators for the Defence enterprise and the future force and joint capabilities respectively. 
The Associate Secretary is the Secretary’s deputy and the key integrator for the single Defence enterprise. The 
Associate Secretary is responsible for Defence enterprise planning, performance and risk management functions and 
is the integrator for all non-military enabling services (facilities and estate, security, information and communications 
technology, information management, human resources, legal and audit). 
The Vice Chief of the Defence Force is the Chief of the Defence Force’s deputy and is responsible for joint 
force integration, interoperability and designing the future force. In addition, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force is 
responsible for preparedness settings, military strategy and is the integrator for all military enabling services  
(Joint Logistics Command policy, Joint Health Command, Australian Defence College, Cadets and Reserves, and the 
Civil Military Centre). 
21 Joint capability needs and requirements functions transfer to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force so that he can acquit his responsibilities as 
joint capability authority.
22 Y. Morieux and P. Tollman, Six Simple Rules — How to Manage Complexity without Getting Complicated, Harvard Business Review Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2014.
23  Black, Rufus, Review of the Defence Accountability Framework, (hereafter the Black Review), Canberra, January 2011.
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Establishing a permanent future force design function means the Vice Chief of the Defence Force will be able 
to clearly set out requirements, including joint requirements. It will also provide capacity to evaluate capability 
development proposals from Capability Managers and review them on a continual basis for alignment with the 
strategic requirements of the Defence mission and investment program. The function should consider individual 
Service (maritime, land, air) and joint capability as well as enabling infrastructure requirements (such as the estate and 
information and communications technology required to support the force posture).
Although the Vice Chief of the Defence Force is currently identified as the Joint Capability Authority, the role has 
limited power to ensure that interoperability requirements are delivered. Currently, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force 
is but one voice among many and has to prove integration issues for consideration. We recommend that the Vice 
Chief of the Defence Force’s decision rights be greatly strengthened, including the right to stop projects 
proceeding through the approval process until joint force integration is proven.
The system of command in the current legislation, the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act), is not congruent with the way 
the Australian Defence Force currently operates and our recommendations regarding One Defence. There is a risk of 
creating uncertainty in relation to command arrangements. 
The Defence Act does not recognise the Australian Defence Force as an entity in its own right; rather it encourages a 
view that the Australian Defence Force is no more than a ‘federation’ of the three Services. 
Subsection 9(2) does not, on its face, give the Chief of the Defence Force full command over the Australian Defence 
Force and, further, the Chief of the Defence Force’s powers may be interpreted as being subject to (and potentially 
constrained by) the authority of the Service Chiefs to command their respective Services. The Defence Act no longer 
reflects actual practice and in effect undermines the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force over the Services. 
This creates uncertainty in relation to command arrangements.24 
In addition, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, who is appointed under section 9AA of the Defence Act, has no 
explicit command authority. There is insufficient recognition of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force’s role, particularly 
as the deputy to the Chief of the Defence Force.25 
In accordance with One Defence and our first principle of clear authorities and accountabilities, we recommend 
the following legislative changes to formally recognise the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force and 
the Vice Chief of the Defence Force:
• The Chief of the Defence Force to have full command of the Australian Defence Force by removing the legislative 
limitations on the Chief of Defence Force’s command power;
• The Vice Chief of the Defence Force to be recognised explicitly as the ‘Deputy’ of the Chief of the Defence Force. 
This amendment would require clarifying that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force has command responsibilities 
as well as administrative responsibilities in relation to the Australian Defence Force as directed by the Chief of the 
Defence Force; and 
• The Service Chiefs to be explicitly subject to the direction of the Chief of the Defence Force. A legislative 
amendment removing their statutory authority would ensure absolute clarity of the Chief of the Defence Force’s 
command and authority.
The changes recommended to establish the strong, strategic centre are not reliant on these legislative changes and 
this recommendation should not be used as a reason to delay implementation.
24 Internal Defence legal advice.
25 ibid.
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Strategic Advisors: Policy, Intelligence and Finance
Operating as One Defence requires the provision of high quality, coherent and timely policy advice to the Secretary, 
Chief of the Defence Force and the Government to inform long term capability and investment as well as a range of 
operational decisions. 
A number of stakeholders raised concerns regarding the quality of policy advice in Defence. Several former Ministers 
stated that policy advice was diffuse, inconsistent and fragmented with one former Minister stating that his lack of 
confidence in Defence’s policy advice led to engagement of third parties to ‘second guess’ it.26 It is crucial that the 
Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force, as the primary policy advisers to Government on Defence issues, are 
provided with high quality strategic policy advice from within Defence. We recommend that policy advice be 
strengthened by bringing all policy functions into one organisational unit in order to improve the quality of 
advice provided to Government.
Defence also requires a mechanism for providing internal contestability, at arm’s-length from owners and sponsors, 
up to the point of decision. This will ensure strategy, plans and resource allocations are tightly aligned and 
appropriately prioritised. It will also foster increased transparency and credibility with central agencies. 
This differs from the current approach which is not at arm’s-length because the internal contestability function reports 
directly to the military 3 star position responsible for the development of requirements. 
We recommend that a strong and credible internal contestability function be built and led by the Deputy 
Secretary Policy and Intelligence with responsibility for:
• Strategic contestability: ensuring the force structure, portfolio of capability investments and individual projects 
deliver government policy objectives and the strategic needs as directed by the Government in the White Paper. 
• Scope, technical and cost contestability: convening in-house expertise with expert challenge panels comprising 
internal and external people that contest key project deliverables (such as scope, schedule, budget, risks, technical 
aspects) throughout approval processes. Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence in conjunction with the Chief 
Finance Officer and external providers would also provide independent contestability of costing models. 
In order to proceed, projects would require sign-off by the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence for their 
consistency with financial, technical and strategic guidance.
Although we recommend consolidation of policy and contestability, the intent is for Defence to have a small team 
of experts with strong credibility and influence with Government. The group must build a strong external network 
of experts and draw on external support. It is also recognised that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force should be 
actively engaged in the formulation of policy advice that relates to the Australian Defence Force.
Intelligence assessment and collection is a key input into high quality policy formulation and capability decision-making. 
It is also a key output for Defence aligned to, and in accordance with, the Government-endorsed National Intelligence 
Priorities. We see the opportunity to further improve policy formulation and capability contestability by bringing the 
individuals involved at the intersection of policy and intelligence closer together under one Deputy Secretary. 
We also see opportunities for improved career development between these areas of expertise. In both areas, Defence 
needs the highest standards of written and analytical skills. There are circumstances where the intelligence agencies 
will be able to examine policy and capability options in their formative stage and assess likely international reactions 
and responses. In turn, policy and capability contestability officers will be able to work with intelligence analysts to 
ensure that all lines of enquiry are being addressed in the development of their assessments. 
We recommend that the policy and intelligence functions be combined under a Deputy Secretary Policy 
and Intelligence, who will have responsibility for providing policy advice and intelligence assessments to 
the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force.
26 Interviews with stakeholders.
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In recommending this structural change we considered the spans of controls and responsibilities of the two Deputy 
Secretary positions currently providing these functions and determined that only one position was required. To 
ensure that the scope of the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence role does not become unmanageable and 
to better align service delivery to customer requirements, we recommend the Defence Security Authority be 
repositioned under the Associate Secretary.
We have considered very carefully the orthodox line of separation between policy advice and intelligence assessment. 
We have confidence that this new One Defence arrangement will operate with integrity for the following three reasons:
• The Defence intelligence agencies work to individual high level mandates that explicitly require independence of 
assessment. These mandates should continue and be reauthorised by the Secretary on an annual basis. These 
mandates provide the agency heads at the two star (Defence Intelligence Organisation) and Senior Executive 
Service Band 2 level (Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation) with an 
unambiguous statement that no-one is to direct them to a particular finding or assessment;
• The Defence intelligence agencies are nested within Australia’s broader intelligence community. This keeps them 
aligned with, and anchored to, their core functions and outputs; and
• The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security27 regularly reviews the independence of the intelligence 
agencies as part of a government-mandated work program. This complements the confidential reporting 
mechanism available to Defence intelligence staff. This mechanism encourages staff at any level working in an 
intelligence agency to lodge a complaint to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security should they believe 
undue influence is being exerted on their assessments.
In essence, we are satisfied that these safeguards will ensure that organisational change does not lead to a ‘merger’ 
of the policy and intelligence functions and that, rather, it will substantively enrich policy advice and capability 
contestability. We emphasise that the authority and autonomy of the heads of the three Defence intelligence agencies 
should remain unchanged and be annually endorsed by the Secretary. 
Chief Finance Officer
The Chief Finance Officer is responsible for providing budgetary contestability in the capability development process 
as well as in the corporate planning and budgeting processes. This involves ensuring portfolio level cost estimates 
align with the available budget. The position of Chief Finance Officer should always be filled by a person with formal 
accounting qualifications and an extensive accounting and finance background.
The Chief Finance Officer also needs to be capable of leading a collaborative dialogue with the Group and Service 
level budget holders, as well as the central agencies on the affordability of Defence’s plans. This dialogue needs to be 
informed by a deep understanding of the underlying cost drivers of the business. 
Senior Committees
The Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force require an effective strategic forum to make major organisational, 
capability and resource trade-off decisions.
The current Defence Committee is unable to play this role effectively. The membership is too broad which slows 
decision-making and undermines the ability of the strategic centre to set direction. The agenda of the committee is 
also expansive, with too little time spent on the big strategic issues.28 
27 The role of the Inspector-General Intelligence and Security is to assist Ministers in the oversight and review of the legality and propriety of the 
activities of the Australian intelligence agencies, and to ensure these activities are conducted in a way that is consistent with human rights.
28 Boston Consulting Group analysed meeting agendas of the most recent six months of the Defence Committee and Secretary and Chief of the 
Defence Force Advisory Committee and interviewed senior leaders. Analysis showed overlapping agendas and committee consideration of matters 
that were the individual responsibility of either the Secretary or Chief of the Defence Force. The committees were also functioning in large part as 
information forums for Defence’s senior leadership.
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We recommend the Defence Committee be repositioned as the primary decision- making committee of 
Defence and the heart of the strategic centre with two supporting committees — Enterprise Business 
Committee and Investment Committee. 
The new Defence Committee should continue to be chaired by the Secretary given the Secretary’s overall 
responsibility for resource management in the Department. Its membership should be limited to the members of the 
strategic centre: the Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Associate Secretary, the Vice Chief of the Defence 
Force, the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence and the Chief Finance Officer. The meetings of the committee 
should be confined to members only. Additional attendees should only be called in when their advice is required and/
or they are presenting to the committee. Alternates should not be permitted. 
The Chief of the Defence Force and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force would represent the Service Chiefs. This is 
in part designed to reduce tension between individual Service and whole-of-Defence objectives and to reinforce the 
Vice Chief of the Defence Force’s role as the military integrator. The Associate Secretary would represent the non-
military enabling functions.
A more strategic agenda should be adopted, focused on the major capability and resource trade-offs and the shared 
accountabilities of the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force, for example:
• Integration of strategic policy advice to Government;
• Endorsement of Defence White Paper, Force Structure Reviews and capability proposals;
• Setting top level resource allocations, including the appropriate balance of resources between capital, operating 
and personnel budgets;
• The approval of plans and scrutiny of performance against those plans including the Defence Investment Plan, 
Corporate Plan and associated Group and Services Plans; and
• Performance management decisions for the senior leadership group (both military personnel and public servants).
In order to ensure that the Defence Committee has sufficient time to focus on strategic issues including major 
capability and resource trade-offs, two subsidiary committees are required: the Enterprise Business Committee and 
the Investment Committee.
To ensure appropriate time and focus can be committed to these strategic committees, we recommend that all 
other enterprise-wide committees be reviewed for their relevance and alignment with the One Defence 
business model with the aim of a substantial reduction in the number of committees.
The Enterprise Business Committee would be chaired by the Associate Secretary and be responsible for 
ensuring the effective running of the Defence organisation, for example, planning, performance monitoring and 
reporting, enterprise risk management, information management and service delivery reform. The committee should 
not deal with matters that are within the purview of individual accountabilities or could be resolved through bilateral 
agreements. Significant reputational and risk issues should be raised to the Defence Committee. 
Membership should comprise the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence, Chief 
Finance Officer, Service Chiefs, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment and the heads of enabling 
functions (human resources, information and communication technology, facilities and estate).
The Investment Committee would be chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and would be responsible 
for undertaking regular holistic reviews of the investment portfolios for capability, estate and information and 
communication technology, taking into account force requirements, all necessary enabling functions and full-life 
costs. As Chair, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force would have decision rights to determine the investment portfolio 
recommendations that are taken to the Defence Committee for approval. 
Chapter 2 | One Defence A Strong, Strategic Centre 27
The Committee would also review project approval proposals in line with the new tailored Defence investment 
approval process outlined in Chapter 3. This would include considering whether the proposal is consistent with 
strategic guidance and is affordable within approved funding envelopes, and whether risks and interdependencies 
have been identified and managed. 
The Investment Committee would also determine and document the accountability for project delivery. This would 
include what parts of the organisation would lead and who would be responsible for the achievement of capability 
outcomes. Failure of projects to be delivered on budget, on schedule and within full-life costs would have clear 
consequences within the new performance management approach (see Chapter 5).
Membership should comprise the Associate Secretary, Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence, Chief Finance 
Officer, Service Chiefs and Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment. A senior official from the 
Department of Finance should be invited to participate as a means of building stronger partnerships with key  
central agencies.
The above changes represent an increase in workload for the Vice Chief of the Defence Force. To address this 
concern and ensure that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force has the capacity to fulfill the responsibilities as defined, 
we recommend that the organisational structure reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force be 
simplified through the incorporation of a two star Head of Joint Enablers role. This would reduce the 
number of direct reports to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force from eight to four and enable him/her to focus 
on championing joint capability and the future force while the new two star officer manages the military enabling 
functions. Below is a possible option but ultimately the Chief of the Defence Force and the Vice Chief of the Defence 
Force will decide the specific structure.
Diagram 6: Possible Vice Chief of the Defence Force Group Structure
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Enterprise Planning and Holding Leaders to Account
The strengthened role of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the implementation of an arm’s-length contestability 
function are critical to a strong, strategic centre. In addition, effective corporate planning and performance monitoring 
are vital to ensure the direction set in the strategic centre is effectively cascaded through the organisation and leaders 
are held to account for their performance. 
Defence needs to improve its corporate planning processes and ensure alignment with the Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act 2013. We recommend a strengthened centre-led, enterprise-wide 
planning and performance monitoring process be adopted.
The major changes Defence must make in its corporate planning are:
• Scope: The corporate planning process should encompass all the major planning documents starting from the 
Corporate Plan and Defence Budget to Preparedness Directives and International Engagement Plans, down to the 
individual Group and Service plans in a consistent, resource-aligned planning cascade;
• Central authority for alignment: The role of the Associate Secretary would be to develop the overall Corporate 
Plan and provide central challenge of the resulting subsidiary planning documents, including the Group and 
Service plans. This would ensure alignment with strategy and priorities as well as appropriate identification and 
management of risks and interdependencies. The Chief Finance Officer would be responsible for ensuring that the 
plans align to resource allocations as part of the same planning process; and
• Performance management: The Associate Secretary should also play the role of chief performance officer, 
undertaking ongoing monitoring and performance management against the agreed Corporate Plan and subsidiary 
planning documents.
We recommend that the Associate Secretary be the central authority to deliver enterprise planning and 
performance monitoring processes, in line with the requirements of the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability Act 2013.
Strategic relationships
The One Defence business model is based on strong alignment between strategy, funding and capability. This 
requires transparency so that key resource trade-offs are resolved explicitly during strategy and planning processes. 
Key to implementation of the new business model is high quality government engagement based on our first principle 
of transparency. This will enable the Minister and the National Security Committee of Cabinet to understand the 
alignment between strategy, funding and capability and the cumulative impact of decisions on this alignment.
At present the relationship between strategy, funding and capability decisions is weak. There is no mechanism to 
reconcile the cumulative effect of previous Government decisions on strategy, capability and funding and therefore to 
highlight when they are no longer aligned. This stems from a lack of a common baseline for the capital and operating 
budget and a regular process whereby Defence reconciles the approved changes it has made or the offsets that have 
been found. 
Several former Ministers and central agency heads referred to situations where they had been confronted with 
projects that had exceeded their budget accompanied by statements that Defence ‘had absorbed’ the overrun.29 
Such limited transparency reduces Defence’s credibility.
Open and continuous dialogue with the Minister for Defence is important particularly in relation to major capital and 
operating funding decisions. We recommend that the Minister for Defence meet with the Defence Committee 
twice yearly to consider a formal strategic assessment of the alignment between Defence’s strategy, 
funding and capability. 
29 Interviews with stakeholders.
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Central agencies lack a common understanding of the major operating cost drivers of Defence. Without an agreed set 
of cost models, it is difficult to have a constructive dialogue in relation to appropriate responses to budget pressures. 
It is evident that central agencies also lack confidence in the capacity of Defence to exercise internal contestability. 
This leads to a debilitating cycle referred to in Chapter One where more process is layered on Defence in an effort 
to obtain the information required and defray risk. Central agencies acknowledge they do not always have sufficient 
context or background to enable them to deal with every issue.30 
We recommend Defence conduct regular reviews of the capital program in consultation with the Minister 
and central agencies. Defence needs to establish a common baseline for capital and operating costs, reconcile 
changes proposed to the baseline and articulate what has been traded off to fit within the overall budget. The 
inclusion of a senior representative from the Department of Finance on the Investment Committee would also facilitate 
this engagement.
30 These matters were canvassed in interviews between the Secretaries of central agencies and the review team.
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One Defence 
Capability Development Life Cycle
3
Key Recommendation 2
Establish a single end-to-end capability development function within 
the department to maximise the efficient, effective and professional 
delivery of military capability
The capability development life cycle (see Annex E) is critical in enabling Defence to perform its primary role 
of defending Australia and contributing to the protection of its national interests. Defence must efficiently and 
effectively procure capability and provide robust and timely advice to Government through an end-to-end capability 
development process. 
Defence’s capability development function has been subjected to extensive external reviews and scrutiny. We 
recognise that, over the last 12 years, significant effort has been expended to improve the capability development 
process. The Defence Procurement Review led by Malcolm Kinnaird in 2003 strengthened the two pass process, led 
to the creation of the Capability Development Group and the establishment of the Defence Materiel Organisation as a 
prescribed agency.31 
Our view is that, whilst these reforms have improved elements of the capability development process, it is now timely 
to review the appropriateness of this model, particularly given the shortcomings identified in this review and the 
persistent external commentary about fundamental inadequacies in the Defence capability development system. 
For example, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee report on Defence procurement 
procedures states that: 
… the weight of evidence indicates that not only has Defence’s preoccupation with process been 
misguided but it has been counterproductive. In response to identified problems, Defence has created 
a procurement process that is convoluted and overburdened by administration. The committee is of 
the view that the entire organisational structure of Defence must be simplified and streamlined. Only by 
reducing the number of stakeholders (groups) involved in the process can the excessive administrative 
burdens and committees be reduced.32 
In our view, the binary choice of whether the Defence Materiel Organisation should be in or out of the Department as 
outlined in the Terms of Reference is too simplistic. Defence needs a smart buying function which operates within the 
larger government system and global supply chains. 
The current capability development construct creates a disconnect between customers and the purchaser as well 
as multiple and unnecessary handover points which increase complexity and risk.33 Given the pre-eminence of 
capability development in executing the Defence mission, we recommend that a single end-to-end capability 
development function be established within Defence.
31 Department of Defence, Procurement Review 2003 (hereafter the Kinnaird Review), August 2003, available at  
<www.defence.gov.au/publications/dprl180903.pdf>.
32 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects: Final Report, August 
2012, p. 250.
33 It became evident during the course of the review that there were handover points between the Force Structure Review and Capability 
Development Group, between Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation, and between the Defence Materiel 
Organisation and the Capability Manager. See in particular Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no. 57 2010–11,  
Acceptance into Service of Navy Capability, June 2011, p. 78-80, available at <www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports>.
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We acknowledge that the establishment of a single, end-to-end capability development function in Defence that is 
efficient, effective and professional will require transformational change. In summary, the required changes include:
• Abolition of the Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation in their current form;
• Creation of a Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group under a Deputy Secretary reporting to the Secretary;
• Moving to a leaner ‘smart buyer’34 model that better leverages industry, is more commercially oriented and delivers 
value for money;
• Strengthening the front end of the capability development life cycle by revising the two pass process, establishing 
an entry gate and creating more opportunity to tailor and fast track projects;
• Standardising project governance processes and procedures for capability delivery and internal review;
• Abolition of the Defence Capability Plan in its current form and replacing it with a Defence Investment Plan that 
incorporates all major investments;
• Strengthening and placing at arm’s-length a continuous contestability function that operates throughout the 
capability development life cycle from concept to disposal; and
• Transferring accountability for requirements setting and management to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and 
the Service Chiefs within a regime of strong, arm’s-length contestability.
Implementation of these changes will require focus and commitment from all members of Defence involved in the 
capability development life cycle. These changes need to start quickly, be pursued with energy and be guided by new 
and strong leadership.
Current state
It is clear that the processes in the current capability development life cycle are cumbersome, excessively 
bureaucratic and inefficient. The organisation is more focused on process adherence than high quality capability 
outcomes. In our view the following are the most significant, but not the only, shortcomings of the current situation:
• An artificial handover point between Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation that 
complicates the focus on capability outcomes;35 
• A complexity of organisation and process which has led to an extremely top heavy Defence Materiel Organisation 
with a structure that, in some cases, is eleven layers deep.36 This has led to a disempowered delivery organisation;
• Elements of the Defence Materiel Organisation which have little or no perceived value as they are not core to the 
acquisition and sustainment function;37 
• An excessive number of System Program Offices evidenced by 83 per cent of expenditure being managed by  
31 per cent of System Program Offices;38 
34 In this context: ‘A smart buyer is one who retains an in-house staff who understands the organization’s mission, its requirements, and its 
customer needs, and who can translate those needs and requirements into corporate direction. A smart buyer also retains the requisite capabilities 
and technical knowledge to lead and conduct teaming activities, accurately define the technical services needed, recognize value during the 
acquisition of such technical services, and evaluate the quality of services ultimately provided. As long as the owner retains the in-house capabilities 
to operate as a smart buyer of facilities, there does not appear to be any greater risk from contracting out a broad range of design review-related 
functions, so long as such functions are widely available from a competitive commercial marketplace. If the owner does not have the capacity to 
operate as a smart buyer, the owner risks project schedule and cost overruns and facilities that do not meet performance objectives.’ See United 
States Government Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-00-172R, Study on Facility Design Reviews, July 2000, available at  
< http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/89986.pdf>.
35 Analysis of interviews with stakeholders.
36 Analysis of Defence personnel data.
37 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, DMO End State Design Final Report, December 2013.
38 Strategy&, Report to DMO, October 2014.
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• A lack of sufficient commercial skills in staff of both Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel 
Organisation including capacity to assess and manage risk;39 
• Capability Managers who are accountable for developing, delivering and sustaining the current and future 
capability needs of the Services but are remote from the critical requirements definition phase which occurs in the 
Capability Development Group; 
• Inappropriate utilisation of military staff who should be the effective stewards of requirements setting within the 
rigour of strong, strategic, financial and technical contestability;40
• An excessive amount of process41 in the capability development life cycle which has become a box-ticking, 
compliance exercise rather than one focused on outcomes;
• Institutionalised and costly project slippage;42 
• Poor management with schedule delays being used to mask cost and technical blowouts and to deflect 
accountability;43 
• An unsophisticated approach to engaging industry, especially early in the project life cycle, and an obsessive focus 
on adherence to probity and competition requirements;44 
• An almost total absence of common internal review processes and procedures;45 
• No appropriately granular mechanism to manage internal cost and schedule and an inadequate methodology for 
estimating operating and sustainment cost;46 and
• Failure to adequately project manage all of the Fundamental Inputs to Capability47 and the lack of a holistic 
portfolio level investment plan.48
39 Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no. 6 2013–14, Capability Development Reform, October 2013.
40 ibid.
41 Boston Consulting Group’s analysis of the Military Integrated Logistics Information System Inventory Procurement Policy and Risk Environment 
Assessment, and material provided by the DMO Standardisation Office during the course of the review.
42 Analysis of data provided by Capability Investment and Resources Division.
43 Interview with members of the Independent Project Performance Office.
44 Interviews with stakeholders.
45 Interviews with Defence Materiel Organisation senior leaders.
46 Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no. 6 2013–14, Capability Development Reform, October 2013, pp. 177-190, 
confirmed in interviews with stakeholders and data provided by Capability Investment and Resources Division.
47 The elements required to generate capability comprise personnel, organisation, collective training, major systems, supplies, facilities and training 
areas, support, and command and management.
48 Analysis of data provided by Capability Investment and Resources Division.
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Structure
The creation of a Capability Development Group was intended to ensure a single point of accountability for managing 
the capability development process and achieving robust outcomes. For the reasons listed above this has not 
worked as envisaged. We recommend disbanding the Capability Development Group in its current form and 
dispersing its functions to more appropriate areas: 
• The contestability and submission development function performed by Capability Investment and Resources 
Division should move to Policy and Intelligence; 
• The requirement development function should be transferred to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the 
Service Chiefs; 
• Australian Defence Test and Evaluation Office and the Project Management Office should move to Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group; and
• Group support functions should be disbanded under the strengthened shared services model (see Chapter 4). 
The Defence Materiel Organisation has also been beset with problems that have impacted its ability to achieve the 
required outcomes. It is clear that the organisation has become top heavy, complex and unnecessarily deep.49 This 
significantly contributes to Defence not getting the capability it needs at a reasonable cost or in reasonable time. 
De-layering and greater empowerment of the organisation is essential for efficient operation. In order to achieve 
this we recommend that the Defence Materiel Organisation be disbanded in its current form and its 
core responsibilities in relation to capability delivery be transferred to a new Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group. 
The new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group would be formed within the Department under a single 
Deputy Secretary reporting to the Secretary. This Deputy Secretary should have extensive experience managing large 
commercial supply chain and project management organisations. Remuneration for this Deputy Secretary should be 
set by the Secretary of Defence at a level that attracts the commercial skills and experience needed.
The new group would manage a project from Gate Zero50 through to Final Operating Capability, including the 
integration of all Fundamental Inputs to Capability. The formation of this new group would create a centre of 
excellence in procurement and capability delivery by consolidating a number of functional areas:
• System Program Offices and other core procurement and sustainment functions from the Defence Materiel 
Organisation under a smart buyer construct;51
• The supply chain and delivery components from Joint Logistics Command;
• The non-materiel procurement function from Defence Support and Reform Group;
• The Defence Science and Technology Organisation; and
• Elements from Capability Development Group as set out above.
As part of the creation of this new group we recommend that a new organisational design and structure is 
developed as part of the implementation process for the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group 
with reduced management layers. 
49 Analysis of Defence personnel data and interviews with stakeholders within Defence Materiel Organisation.
50 Gate Zero is a new, formalised point in the approval process where a concept is given approval to progress for development and potential 
consideration at first pass. 
51 A smart buyer construct will ensure Defence can make strategic decisions regarding the most appropriate procurement and contracting 
methodologies and will support flexible tailoring options to implement the most suitable methodology.
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In Chapter 5 of this report there are significant recommendations with regard to the development of workforce skills 
and talent management. All of these will be required to make the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group an 
effective and efficient organisation. 
We have heard many complaints from the Defence Materiel Organisation leadership about the ability to hire and fire 
public servants. We agree with the advice provided by the previous Public Service Commissioner that the Public 
Service Act 1999 provides more flexibility than Defence has utilised which indicates that this is a managerial rather 
than legislative issue. For example, the decision to hire ongoing or non-ongoing staff is a matter for each department. 
Non-ongoing terms can be for either a specified term or a specific project, that is, for three years or for the duration of 
the project. If the non-ongoing period is greater than 12 months it will need to be advertised formally.
Smart Buyer and Industry
We envisage that the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group would comprise a smaller core group of skilled 
public servants managing a ‘smart buyer’ function. This function is reliant on an enhanced relationship with industry 
which would provide expertise in managing projects in the acquisition and sustainment phases. In this context we are 
not proposing a ‘one size fits all’ approach. We recognise that each Systems Program Office is inherently different, 
with different operating and contracting models as well as various and sometimes unique commercial arrangements. 
We recommend that each System Program Office be examined and analysed to determine:
• Where it fits within the smart buyer function; and
• The most appropriate procurement model for delivering the capability and achieving value for money. 
In some cases it would be appropriate to outsource completely the acquisition and sustainment functions conducted by 
a Systems Program Office. In other cases it may be appropriate to outsource sustainment and partner with industry for 
the acquisition phase. It may be determined that certain Systems Program Offices, such as clothing, may be best dealt 
with under the non-materiel procurement function. We consider that it would be possible to rationalise and reduce the 
Systems Program Office structure and staffing levels as more sophisticated contracting models are established and their 
individual support functions are consolidated as part of the service delivery reform (see Chapter 4). 
The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group should outsource significant elements of the project management 
associated with sustainment contracts to an appropriate provider or providers. Work has already been completed 
internally that could be leveraged to support this requirement.52 We envisage efficient implementation would result in 
reductions in the public service workforce and the transfer of military personnel to other functions within Defence (see 
Chapter 6).
Implementing a smart buyer function would allow Defence to focus on planning and governance, and industry to 
focus on execution. Defence personnel should not be planning technical work but instead providing an oversight role 
— reviewing and approving plans developed by industry to meet outcomes required by Defence.
We have had significant evidence from industry and other commentators53 that the current reliance on a ‘one size fits 
all’ competition policy and the use of complex procurement contracts does not produce the best results from domestic 
and international industry. It also adds significant cost and time for all participants and encourages unrealistic costing to 
be included in the decision-making process. The importance and relevance of competitive tension amongst prospective 
bidders varies from project to project. In some cases there may be only one realistic option. 
Implementation of a smart buyer approach will involve tailoring procurement strategies appropriately which will enable 
industry to be involved earlier and undertake project and contract management activities currently undertaken by 
Defence. This is particularly relevant in the sustainment phase of the life cycle and should encompass the progress 
made through the Rizzo and Coles reforms.54 
52 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, DMO End State Design Final Report, December 2013.
53 Interviews with stakeholders.
54 See Rizzo, Paul, Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management Practices, July 2011; and Coles, John, e al., Study into the Business of 
Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability, Canberra, November 2012.
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A number of work units have grown within the current Defence Materiel Organisation that are peripheral to the core 
business of the delivery organisation. The work of some of these units may be more efficiently carried out by other 
areas of government, or not carried out at all. One example is Industry Division: its roles and functions should be 
transferred to the Department of Industry which would have the benefit of placing Defence industry within the broad 
Australian industrial landscape. 
The outputs of Defence industry should be viewed as a Fundamental Input to Capability and be integrated into the 
acquisition life cycle. This may well mean a more imaginative use of a small number of potential contractors early 
in the process or the extension and use of already existing collaborative mechanisms (such as rapid prototyping, 
development and evaluation) at the very early stages of requirements development. 
Fundamental Inputs to Capability
We recognise that the responsibility for the total range of Fundamental Inputs of Capability is necessarily distributed 
throughout the Defence organisation. However, it is important to manage these inputs in an integrated manner in 
order to bring capability into service. 
There is evidence that current shortfalls and delays in the introduction of capability occur between Initial Materiel 
Release and Initial Operating Capability.55 The predominant reason for this is the lack of integration of non-materiel 
elements such as estate and information and communications technology. Therefore, we recommend that the 
Capability Managers specify the Fundamental Inputs to Capability requirements with the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group having responsibility for developing and delivering an integrated 
project plan. Full accountability for project delivery will not be complete until this has been achieved.
Requirements Setting and Management
The added value in utilising Australian Defence Force personnel in the acquisition and sustainment life cycle is their 
expertise in the creation and management of requirements. This process has become cumbersome, complex and 
inefficient despite the good intentions in the creation of Capability Development Group.56 
Capability Managers, which include the Vice Chief of the Defence Force for joint capability, should own the 
requirements phase. This is not currently the case. We recommend the accountability for requirements 
setting and management be transferred to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Service Chiefs 
with strategic, financial and technical contestability being located with Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence. We acknowledge this will require the enhancement of skills in the Capability Managers’ headquarters 
and a rebalancing of the workforce in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. 
Arms-Length Contestability
At the same time all requirements at each phase of the life cycle should be subject to strong arm’s-length and expert 
contest. Both the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence should have 
‘red card’ decision rights on projects at each gate for future force design and joint force integration and strategic, 
technical and financial elements respectively.
55 Australian National Audit Office, ANAO Report no.14, 2013-14 Major Projects Report, p. 17, available at  
<www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports>.
56 Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no. 6 2013–14, Capability Development Reform, October 2013, pp. 138-139.
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The kernel of an appropriate arm’s-length contest organisation is already present in the Independent Project 
Performance Office in the Defence Materiel Organisation and the Capability Investment and Resources Division in 
Capability Development Group. We recommend that the Independent Project Performance Office and the 
Capability Investment and Resources Division be relocated to Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence, 
significantly enhanced and strengthened to provide such contest. This is not to be seen as an opportunity 
for inexperienced personnel to block capability proposals without good reason. The establishment of a robust and 
disciplined contestability function is intended to provide arm’s-length assurance to the Secretary that the capability 
needs and requirements are aligned with strategy and resources and can be delivered. It needs to be designed to 
enable the best outcomes.
Revised two pass process
The approvals granted at gates in the current two pass process have moved away from the original intent as outlined 
by Kinnaird.57 A number of stakeholders expressed concern over the tendency to finalise a preferred solution too 
early. Instead of first pass being agreement to assess realistic options, it is often the point at which a preferred 
solution is agreed. 
As a result, the documentation set and resultant effort required to get through first pass has increased, with little 
discernible improvement in the quality of decisions being made. A number of stakeholders expressed the view that 
the volume of documentation reduces clarity and makes good decision-making more difficult.58
To resolve the issues outlined above, we recommend a revised Defence investment approval process for all 
large or complex capability projects. 
Diagram 7: Defence Investment Approval Process
57 Department of Defence, Procurement Review 2003 (hereafter the Kinnaird Review), August 2003, available at  
<www.defence.gov.au/publications/dprl180903.pdf>.
58 Interviews with stakeholders.
Government approval 
of the Defence 
Investment Plan
Capability 
Managers:  
Present business 
cases
Policy & Intelligence: 
Contestability
Chief Finance 
Officer:  
Financial 
contestability
Vice 
Chief of the  
Defence Force:  
Capabilty coordination 
and integration 
WHITE PAPER AND ANNUAL FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW PROCESS
Defence Committee 
and the Defence 
Investment Committee
Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment as the 
delivery agent
CONTESTABILITY
Approval to develop options 
to an agreed standard of 
fidelity by a set date and 
within a set budget.
CONTESTABILITY 
Approval to refine a proposal 
for government to a high 
level of fidelity by a set date 
within a set budget.
CONTESTABILITY
Approval to explore options, 
to be considered by a set 
date; within a set budget.
Contract formation  
and acquisition
Government approval 
to acquire
GATE ZERO: 
Investment 
portfolio entryCapability 
Acquisition and 
Sustainment 
Group will be 
project manager
Capability 
Manager will 
be the sponsor 
throughout the 
capability  
life cycleFIRST PASS: 
Entry to the 
Investment Plan
SECOND PASS: 
Approval to 
acquire
Rejected Options
Rejected Options
Rejected Options
Fa
st
-tr
ac
k 
O
pt
io
ns
First Principles Review | CREATING ONE DEFENCE38
This revised process should include gates designed such that projects start with radically different options to meet 
the strategic need then narrow to a preferred solution within agreed timeframes. The document set for each approval 
gate should be reviewed and redesigned to be fit for purpose with the goal of significantly reducing the documents 
required to achieve final approval.
The front end of the process should be strengthened by having a much more thorough review of projects at initiation. 
Specifically, we recommend that a new formal gate be incorporated into the process at the entry point — 
Gate Zero: Investment Portfolio entry. This gate will be the point at which approval is provided to explore the 
range of options that may be suitable for a potential project. 
At this point the Capability Manager is formally designated as the sponsor and the Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group provides support during the development of requirements and options. Gate Zero would not be 
the point at which public announcements are made about a project commitment. Rather, the project would enter the 
delivery and approval process with agreed time lines and conditions for consideration at first pass. 
Each Capability Manager would need to maintain a pipeline of potential new capability projects which are under 
consideration (based on their view of the evolving capability needs within their domain) but not yet ready to enter the 
Defence Investment Plan.
At Gate Zero and first pass, approval would be provided for the next stage of work only, based on a view that 
investment in the next stage was worthwhile given the overall business case. The documentation set required at each 
gate should include only the analysis required to inform the decision being made at the particular gate.
The current shopping list approach towards the Defence Capability Plan would cease.59 The arm’s-length 
contestability function described previously should test that projects are both likely to fit with the future capability 
needs of Defence and ready in all aspects to proceed to the next gate. If timeframes, technical requirements and 
financial commitments approved at each gate are not met, the request for approval to proceed to the next gate 
should be rejected. This means that projects can be restarted at Gate Zero or removed altogether.
Not all projects need to follow the full process — there should be judicious use of a fast track path, subject to strong 
contestability that confirms delivery risks are acceptable. This will improve efficiency, reduce the duration of the pre-
acquisition phase and relieve pressure on the volume of Government approvals. It is the common sense approach of 
a smart buyer. 
The option to skip first pass and proceed straight from Gate Zero to second pass should be considered at the Gate 
Zero decision point where:
• There is only one feasible supplier of the required platform;
• Defence is acquiring additional units of an existing capability;
• There are mandatory interoperability requirements that require a certain platform choice;
• Operational urgency is more important than optimising capability/cost trade-off; and /or
• The project is relatively simple.
In addition, we recommend the Government increase approval thresholds for capability development 
projects, with ministerial approval required only for projects above $20 million, two ministers above $100 
million and Cabinet above $250 million.60 
59 The Defence Capability Plan is widely seen as little more than a shopping list because the hurdles to being listed in the plan are minimal and 
individual projects are not assessed on an opportunity cost basis before being listed in the plan.
60 Since July 2011, the Minister for Defence may approve projects valued at $20 million or less, the Minister for Defence and the Finance Minister 
may approve projects valued up to $100 million, and all projects of greater value must be considered and approved by Cabinet.
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At present, half of the projects considered by Government are worth less than six per cent of the total program 
cost. Increasing the thresholds would result in around a 30 per cent reduction in the number of Cabinet submissions 
required for the current Defence Capability Plan. 
This change would accelerate project delivery, ensure that senior attention is focused on critical projects and would 
start to reduce the transactional nature of interactions with Government, which need not be concerned with smaller 
capability projects. 
Policy and Process
In an organisation which routinely manages complex projects and programs we found it remarkable that there 
is no common project management architecture or artefacts to support it. There are no standardised reporting 
mechanisms (reporting is informal, anecdotal, local or crisis based) or management processes, with all divisions 
having different methodologies and management systems.61 There has been no consistent application of fundamental 
tools such as Earned Value Management. Such tools will be required to support the new leadership team. 
Standardised management and reporting tools are necessary to enable the leaders of this function to manage the 
business well. We recommend that there be significant investment in the development of: 
• An operational framework which briefly but comprehensively explains how the organisation operates 
and the roles and responsibilities within it; 
• A detailed set of life cycle management processes which provide the project and engineering discipline 
with which to manage complex materiel procurement from initiation to disposal; and
• A review architecture which reinforces accountability at all levels and brings together information at 
each level upon which good management decisions can be made.
We recognise that this will involve a large amount of work but it is essential that it be done to allow for proper project 
management governance. All of this needs to be underpinned by a strong and enduring approach to communication 
to ensure quality employee and stakeholder commitment. 
Significant changes will also need to be made to the management information systems to support the timely 
provision of information. As a benchmark, we recommend that the Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment must sign off and assure the Secretary of the operational output of each of his/her 
divisions every quarter and on major contracts on a monthly basis. This arrangement should be cascaded 
throughout the organisation. 
It is also incumbent upon the organisation to have a process in place that effectively measures its cost, schedule and 
productivity at a project level. This should be implemented immediately and individual leaders from the first line to 
the Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment must be accountable for cost and schedule targets.
Net Personnel and Operating Cost is Defence’s cuurent estimate of the personnel, operating and sustainment cost 
of a proposed capability. It is an estimate of the differential cost above that of the current capability and is included in 
submissions to Government for approval. This approach is problematic as it does not inform Government of the total 
cost of the project across the life of the capability. Net Personnel and Operating Cost is also hard to estimate and 
often inaccurate. We recommend this process cease immediately. 
Defence needs to spend more time on defining the cost estimates and presenting a total project cost for both 
acquisition and sustainment. The costs should be independently assured before being presented to Government to 
ensure appropriate rigour and fidelity. Our proposed approval process will also make accountability for project delivery 
clear (to specification, on schedule and on budget), with management of consequences an essential feature of the 
new performance management culture (see Chapter 5).
61 Interviews with members of the Independent Project Performance Office.
First Principles Review | CREATING ONE DEFENCE40
Defence Investment Plan
The Defence Capability Plan as a management tool is problematic as it focuses on capital equipment only and is seen 
generally as a ‘shopping list’62 of projects requested by the Services. It is too easy to get a project onto the Defence 
Capability Plan as the Force Structure Review process is irregular and not appropriately contested. We recommend 
development of a Defence Investment Plan which would include all capital and related investments (such 
as materiel, estate and facilities, workforce and information and communications technology). 
This plan should be reviewed annually, as part of the planning process, and would be a vital part of managing capital 
trade-offs and prioritising all capital projects across the portfolio. A version of this plan should be made available to industry 
to enable appropriate planning for future capital projects. Defence must ensure that the Defence Investment Plan includes 
costing for all the Fundamental Inputs of Capability to bring them into service and not just the materiel element.
Currently Defence over-programs the Defence Capability Plan to ensure money is spent when schedule slippage 
occurs. We acknowledge that the Defence capital budget is not easily reduced to predictable annual budgets 
and is subject to fluctuations because of urgent operational requirements, foreign currency risks and uncertainties 
associated with large developmental projects. Therefore, over-programming is understandable but should be 
contained to the portfolio level to defray the risk of a budget underspend, managed carefully by the Secretary with 
information provided via a transparent process to central agencies. 
Defence also utilises cost slippage as a budgeting tool due to the Defence Materiel Organisation being historically unable 
to expend all allocated funding. In practice, a percentage of the acquisition budget is initially withheld from the Defence 
Materiel Organisation which means at the start of an acquisition project they do not have their total planned budget. 
This practice is inconsistent with a smart buyer construct and holding people to account for delivery. We 
recommend that, on Government approval, the entire project acquisition budget is allocated to the 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group to ensure expenditure is in accordance with the project 
delivery plan.
Defence Science and Technology Organisation
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation is valued by Defence and national security agencies for its 
contribution to saving lives, reducing risk, saving money and enhancing capabilities. It provides a range of specialised 
and technical services across both Defence and the national security community and has developed state-of-the-art 
technology that is being used across the world today.
We were advised that the Defence Science and Technology Organisation has been on a reform journey for a number of 
years. Despite a significant reduction in personnel and resources, it has continued to provide the required services to its 
customers. There are numerous examples of the efficiencies gained and money saved through its work across Defence.63 
Whilst we acknowledge that good work is being undertaken by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, it 
struggled to articulate clearly to the review team the value that it contributes to Defence outcomes. We recommend 
that the Defence Science and Technology Organisation be required to clearly articulate its value 
proposition. This would include examples and actual amounts of value created.
We acknowledge that around 80 per cent of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation work is conducted 
in support of capability projects. As the Defence Science and Technology Organisation is largely a capability enabling 
group, we recommend that it become part of the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group.
62 The shopping list description refers to the ease with which projects can be included in the Defence Capability Plan and the fact that once a 
project is in the plan, it will be acquired regardless of any other factor.
63 RJ Trenberth, Review of DSTO’s External engagement and contribution to Australia’s wealth, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 
2004, Canberra; interviews with stakeholders; and DSTO submission to the First Principles Review.
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The structure of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation is top heavy with three Senior Executive Service 
Band 3 equivalent positions and 14 Senior Executive Service Band 2 equivalent positions. We recommend the 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation senior leadership be rationalised. 
On the information considered during the review, there is no clear case for outsourcing the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation and, in fact, this approach may be detrimental to the support it offers to Defence and its 
other customers. 
Whilst wholesale outsourcing would not be wise, there is more opportunity to outsource elements to the broader 
scientific community, particularly in industry and academia. We recommend that strong partnerships be 
established with key academic and research institutions to leverage the knowledge of scientists and 
create pathways into and out of academia and industry. In this context the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation Advisory Board is not required and we recommend that it be disbanded.
The Chief Defence Scientist should examine the methodology utilised to prioritise blue sky research versus the applied 
research program. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation has a niche role to play in a much larger global 
scientific research program and it is vital that its blue sky research focuses on matters of special relevance to Australia. 
We recommend that Defence, in partnership with academia and industry, review its developmental research 
priorities, their alignment with future force requirements and capacity to leverage allied partners, in order to 
promote innovation and make the most valuable contribution to future Defence capability.
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4
One Defence 
Corporate and 
Military Enablers
Key Recommendation 3
Fully implement an enterprise approach to the delivery of  
corporate and military enabling services to maximise their 
effectiveness and efficiency
The evolution of an enterprise approach to the delivery of both corporate and military enabling services in Defence 
has been slow and hard-fought. The panel views this with concern. It is again a symptom of a federated business 
model resisting a One Defence approach. We acknowledge that these reforms have struggled because Defence 
does not yet have the service delivery ethos required of a large operational organisation, and when there are 
budgetary pressures, the enablers are the first to lose funding. This volatility drives reactive management practices 
focused on short term fixes which result in longer term opportunity costs and delivery risks.
The enablers are critical to the effective and efficient delivery of capability. Moving to a One Defence approach will 
require further consolidation and standardisation especially in estate, information management, geospatial intelligence 
and customer-centric service delivery. 
Defence Estate 
The One Defence estate needs to be clearly aligned to current and future capability and force posture requirements. 
It must meet the requirements of the Services and enabling workforce in the most efficient way. The estate 
requirements increasingly need to take into account the common and integrated needs of the three Services.
Current State
The Defence estate is a critical enabler of the country’s defence capability and supports the generation and 
sustainment of the Australian Defence Force. It includes bases, training areas and ranges, training institutions, 
research and development facilities and airfields and wharves to launch operations. It is the largest land holding in 
Australia (over three million hectares) with 75 major bases and has a gross replacement value of $68 billion.
Key issues with the current estate portfolio are that: 
• The current footprint does not align with current and future Australian Defence Force requirements. It has largely 
evolved over time, is a product of history, much of it now redundant, and in some cases is boarded up to avoid 
use and minimise maintenance costs;
• There is insufficient funding to maintain the current footprint and the remaining useful life of the estate has reduced 
from 22 to 16 years since 2001 because of under-investment;64 
• Defence is now caught in an unsustainable cycle of insufficient funding to maintain the current estate footprint. 
This leads to deterioration in quality, diversion of a growing proportion of funds to non-value adding maintenance 
and health and safety compliance, which further exacerbates deterioration of the estate. This cycle is progressively 
increasing risk, adversely impacting capability and preparedness, diverting funding from investment in the future 
and making future investment initiatives more difficult;65 and
• Improvements in Defence management processes, sourcing and investment prioritisation have proved insufficient 
to break this cycle.
64 Analysis of Defence data, December 2014. See also Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Report no.41 2010–11,  
Maintenance of the Defence Estate, pp.11, 62, available at <www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports>.
65 Department of Defence (prepared by AECOM Australia Pty Ltd.), The Future Defence Estate Report Volume 1 Executive Summary, Canberra, 
November 2012.
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Significant consolidation and realignment of the estate is needed, as has been identified in numerous reviews  
(see Diagram 8). Despite identifying opportunities for consolidation, repeated efforts by Defence to reduce and realign 
the footprint have proven to be complex and difficult with little success.66 
Diagram 8: Previous reviews identified opportunities for consolidation
For reasons of history and legacy, releasing parts of the estate can be hard for the Services despite indications from 
Australian Defence Force leadership that it is supportive of a major rationalisation. More importantly, the failure to 
consolidate the estate has been a product of political intransigence by governments of both persuasions over many 
decades, with numerous consolidation proposals from Defence not receiving endorsement to proceed. Even the 
current base-by-base consolidation approach rarely gains endorsement67. 
Existing opportunity
Through the 2012 Future Defence Estate Report, Defence has already identified 17 sites (out of 75 major bases) for 
closure and disposal.68 These closures would not affect current operational capability or future needs and would lead 
to a more strategically and functionally aligned estate as well as improved financial sustainability. 
A conservative net present value estimate of the disposal of these sites over 30 years is $1.4 billion, including property 
sales at a market value of $570 million, of which a bare minimum of $210 million would accrue in the first 10 years.69 
This net present value estimate also includes the cost of remediation but does not include future maintenance savings. 
66 Department of Defence, Estate Companion Review, A Strategic Framework for the Defence Estate, Canberra, 2008.
67 Interviews with stakeholders.
68 Advice from Defence Infrastructure Division, December 2014.
69 Analysis of data provided by Defence Infrastructure Division, December 2014.
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Our requests for Defence to quantify the market value of its land holdings led to this very conservative net 
present value estimate which in our opinion has been developed in isolation, without consideration of commercial 
opportunities or consultation with other potentially interested parties. 
In our view, this proposal has not been optimised for speedy realisation of commercial opportunities. It suggests 
limited awareness of the potential value of Defence’s properties and the commercial interest in some of its key 
metropolitan sites. This is puzzling given that the Government has recently provided Defence with a significant 
incentive to dispose of unnecessary estate by allowing it to use the proceeds of sale for Defence purposes. 
Alternative uses for surplus Defence sites in metropolitan areas can be economically beneficial, for example, allowing 
development of residential and commercial spaces. Much of the land is prime real estate, which makes disposal 
more compelling from a taxpayer viewpoint. As most of these sites are underutilised, contemporary redevelopment 
would also help promote the Government’s national productivity, employment and infrastructure goals. 
While we understand the political sensitivities associated with estate disposal, we do not accept this as an excuse to 
allow the ongoing waste and inefficiency associated with keeping estate that is surplus to Defence requirements.
Transforming the Defence Estate
A radical change in approach is now required for estate consolidation and realignment and for obtaining government 
approval. This will pave the way for a smaller, more efficient and more strategically aligned estate footprint. 
We recommend that Defence define the estate need as determined by future force requirements and that 
Government agree to dispose of all unnecessary estate holdings starting with the 17 bases identified in 
the 2012 Future Defence Estate Report.
There needs to be a clear link between capability, future force needs and estate requirements (including timing, 
location and cost). This link will emerge from the White Paper 2015, Force Structure and corporate planning 
processes. Under the One Defence business model, the strengthened role of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force 
in future force design should include the articulation of force posture requirements. The estate must be managed so 
that it can be invested in, sustained, and disposed of as enduring future force requirements dictate.
The First Principles Review high level implementation plan recommends a process to get the estate rationalisation 
started. It provides a timeline to make ready and sell the unnecessary parts of the estate that are surplus to 
requirements. Noting that proceeds from sales will be available for reinvestment, Defence needs to be able to clearly 
explain to the Government and community the reasons parts of the estate are no longer required and the benefits 
to the nation of investing in other Defence priorities. We recommend that Defence strengthen its capability to 
present options to Government for estate disposal including obtaining expert external advice as required.
Defence will need to consider further rationalisation beyond the current 17 identified sites. This rationalisation should 
balance the interests of Defence, community, local government and economic development, and include a mix of sites in 
terms of commercial attractiveness and political sensitivity. As part of this approach, Defence will need to create an open 
dialogue with the community to explain the future Defence estate needs and the case for consolidation.
We have been advised that current approval processes for infrastructure projects can add significant time delays. 
Consolidation, disposal and reinvestment in Defence infrastructure routinely requires the consideration and approval 
of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works. 
Since 2006, the infrastructure projects forwarded by Defence for the Committee’s consideration have increased both 
in number and in value. For instance, in 2014, the Committee approved expenditure of $1.5 billion on facilities to 
support the Joint Strike Fighter, and Defence expects to manage between 150 and 200 major capital facilities and 
infrastructure projects each year for the next decade.70 
70 Data provided by Defence Infrastructure Division, October 2014.
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Under current arrangements, projects with a value of $2 million or more are notified to the Committee with a request 
to proceed as medium works,71 while works valued at $15 million or more must be referred to the Committee for 
consideration and report to the Parliament before work can proceed.72 
The present thresholds of $2 million for medium works and $15 million for major works were last revised in 2010 
and 2006 respectively. They do not align well with thresholds for the approval of military equipment, so that more 
extensive consideration may be required for the approval of facilities works of a lower value than the military 
equipment they are intended to support. The present thresholds add more than a month to the time required to 
commence medium works, and three to six months to the time required to commence major works.73 
In order to improve procedural efficiency we recommend that the Government amend the Public Works 
Committee Act 1969 to set a $75 million threshold for referring proposed works to the Public Works 
Committee, and reconsider recent adjustments to the 2015–16 Budget operational rules that run counter 
to more efficiently managing investment spending. These are further constraints that should be removed as 
their removal would reduce overhead, cost and delays to infrastructure projects. 
Information Management
Information management is a critical enabler for One Defence. In the military environment, information management 
must provide the war fighter with common battlespace awareness and information superiority through integrated 
and interoperable information. It underpins the next generation of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and links sensors and weapons platforms. It 
is crucial to offset the relatively small size of the Australian Defence Force and enable a competitive war fighting 
advantage over Australia’s adversaries. 
Within the corporate arena, information management must enable the organisation to make informed decisions, 
measure performance, provide timely, credible, traceable and relevant management information, and support 
enterprise-wide business processes. It must be underpinned by a trusted single source of enterprise-wide data, and 
to the extent possible, common and standardised applications and infrastructure.
Current State
Information management has been a persistent challenge for Defence and has been identified as an issue in 
numerous reviews of the organisation. Previous projects and approaches have been unsuccessful in driving the 
required information management outcomes and it is apparent that current practices are materially impeding 
operational effectiveness and efficiency.74 Defence’s information management needs are not being met and this will 
only be exacerbated as innovations in technology and technologically advanced Defence capabilities (for example, 
the Joint Strike Fighter) further raise the bar for information management capabilities.
We have been furnished with examples of inadequate interoperability between and within military platforms that 
impact on operational effectiveness.75 Similarly, there are significant shortcomings in the corporate arena that limit 
Defence’s ability to make fast well-informed decisions and maintain information security protocols which may result in 
failure to meet legislative and regulatory compliance.76 
71 See paragraph 1.31 of Procedure Manual: Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (8th edition), March 2010, available at  
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Public_Works>.
72 See s. 18(9)(a) of the Public Works Committee Act 1969, as amended.
73 Data provided by Defence Infrastructure Division, October 2014.
74 Air Vice Marshal John Blackburn (rtd), http://www.sldinfo.com/an-australian-perspective-on-the-way-ahead-for-a-pacific-strategy/  
[accessed 18 February 2015].
75 Defence classified briefing materials provided to the review team regarding air, land and sea platforms.
76 Briefing materials provided to the review team by the Chief Finance Officer and Chief Joint Logistics on accounting and inventory systems.
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Inefficiencies and waste are evidenced by a costly and complex application landscape that limits flexibility and 
‘locks’ data into systems. As noted in Chapter One, the Chief Information Officer stated that Defence has over 2500 
applications, including 300 financial applications.
While the Department’s intent has been to make the Chief Information Officer responsible for information 
management across Defence, in practice accountability has remained fragmented and unclear. There has been a lack 
of effective governance and control which has led to siloed solutions, especially in the military arena where the Chief 
Information Officer Group has less domain expertise and is further removed from the end user.
Transforming Information Management
Remediating and transforming information management in large organisations is inherently messy. In making our 
recommendations, we are mindful of getting the governance right and gradually building interoperability, compatibility 
and simplicity over time.
The information management agenda must be driven from the top with the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence 
Force as champions, with clear authority across Defence delegated to the Associate Secretary to oversee robust and 
effective governance processes. 
To ensure military interoperability, a C4ISR design authority, reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, should 
be put in place to define the warfighting environment and architecture, and set military interoperability requirements. 
We recommend that the Associate Secretary be directed and resourced to implement enterprise 
information management that provides Defence with trusted information to inform decision-making and 
military interoperability, with the Vice Chief of the Defence Force as the design authority for C4ISR.
We also recommend that the information management agenda be governed at the Band 3/3 star level by 
the Enterprise Business Committee to set overall direction and priorities, including the management of 
trade-offs and conflicts. 
As directed by the Associate Secretary, the Chief Information Officer’s responsibilities would be to implement the 
enterprise information management agenda and be the authority for all enterprise networks. The Chief Information 
Officer would authorise all information management expenditure as a part of the planning cycle. 
The technical authority for enterprise information management frameworks including architecture, standards, policy 
and master data management must reside with the Chief Information Officer. Responsibilities would include the 
mandate to stop projects — corporate or C4ISR — that do not comply with interoperability standards or, under 
exceptional circumstances, escalate decisions to the Enterprise Business Committee as the governance forum 
for information management. We recommend supporting the Chief Information Officer to meet these 
responsibilities by formally recognising the Chief Technology Officer as the technical authority with 
appropriate ‘red card’ decision rights. 
Defence should establish a number of foundational information management building blocks to implement  
One Defence frameworks for architecture, standards and master data management. 
Accordingly, we recommend that Defence establish enterprise-wide frameworks for architecture 
standards and master data management.
We also recommend that Defence embark on a pragmatic implementation road map to standardise 
business and information processes and their supporting applications. 
This will necessitate a move over time to a small number of standardised information and communications systems 
supporting enterprise-wide processes and a radically simplified application landscape through retiring legacy 
solutions and adopting enterprise master data. 
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We note a number of domain-specific information management reform programs are already under way or planned 
in Defence. These must be aligned and leveraged under the new model including the human resource management 
and payroll system, the garrison and estate management system, financial information system reform, and logistics 
system modernisation. The Chief Information Officer will have to ensure that all of this work is consistent with the 
information management transformation agenda.
We recommend that Defence ensure adequate resourcing and funding for information management 
reform is prioritised as part of the fully costed 2015 Defence White Paper.
Geospatial intelligence
The Terms of Reference make particular reference to geospatial intelligence. We note that an external provider has 
conducted two reviews with the findings presented to the Defence Committee which was unable to make a decision 
about implementing the recommendations. This in our view is an example of Defence being unable to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the enterprise as a whole. 
Current State 
Defence does not have a unified geospatial information enterprise. It has a series of stand-alone organisations 
that collect, analyse, maintain and distribute single domain foundation geospatial information. They have separate 
systems, business models, workforce planning, internal governance and capability development processes — all 
operating with little reference to each other or to a coherent plan for collective action.77 
Geospatial information management is currently under-resourced, with poorly coordinated investment, limited 
leadership, obscure accountability, low management prioritisation and disaggregated thinking about strategy and 
direction.78 Current, planned and future Australian Defence Force platforms and operations are all critically reliant on 
integrated geospatial data and services. The remediation of this key enabler is urgent. 
Transforming geospatial intelligence
The systems necessary to deliver these geospatial intelligence services are complex and operate at very high 
security classifications. They will only deliver the required services to the war fighter at the right time through greater 
integration of the associated production and distribution systems and stronger professional linkages between the 
maritime, land, and aerospace geospatial intelligence domains. 
Stronger linkages with the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation would lead to more effective geospatial 
intelligence support for war fighter operations and would add significant expertise to the Australian Geospatial-
Intelligence Organisation.
Strengthening the Services’ linkages with the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation should be achieved 
through the adoption of more effective information and communication systems and appropriate secure facilities. 
Service geospatial intelligence staff should be further embedded with the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence 
Organisation, and vice versa, to provide direct input to the geospatial picture, supported by an array of broader 
products from the intelligence community. 
We note that the Services’ geospatial intelligence workforce is currently based outside Canberra so ‘virtual’ 
embedding will be needed for some time. A more holistic integration into a single agency would realise greater 
efficiencies and productivity. 
We see, therefore, the urgent need for the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation to have more central 
control of connectivity and resourcing of the broader virtual Defence geospatial enterprise. Like Defence’s United 
77 Department of Defence (prepared by KPMG), Geospatial Enterprise Review Phase 2 Final Report, September 2014, p. 8
78  Ibid., page 5.
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Kingdom and United States counterparts in this area, moving to a single agency offers Defence the best model for 
the provision of geospatial information and services into the future. 
We recommend that geospatial information functions be consolidated into the Australian Geospatial-
Intelligence Organisation following improved resourcing and connectivity.
Service Delivery Reform Program
The renewed focus on developing a service delivery system within Defence initiated by the Secretary and Chief of 
Defence Force in April 2014 is acknowledged, particularly as it recognises that previous approaches to implementing 
shared services have not worked well. 
We also note the whole-of-government agenda focused on the implementation of shared services. Defence is 
expected to align with this approach and be subject to external scrutiny of outcomes and performance by a public 
service wide governance board.
Current State
Notwithstanding the intent of the work Defence is doing in this area and the whole-of-government agenda, we remain 
concerned by:
• The limited ability of some areas to deliver on the true intent of a customer-provider model. Human resources 
provided by Defence People Group is an example of this: users have implemented workarounds and employed 
their own human resource staff because of the Group’s inability to deliver;79 
• The resistance of some leaders to accept the shared service model;80 and
• The reluctance to empower single accountable officers in such areas as information management, public affairs 
and finance. 
It is critical for the development of the One Defence system that the shared services model is fully implemented. 
This will mean standardising services, removing duplication of functions, professionalising the workforce and ensuring 
there are single, clear lines of ownership and accountability. 
Defence lacks a service delivery culture. This manifests itself in providers and customers not appropriately negotiating 
with each other, enabling functions not providing responsive services and customers duplicating functions as they do 
not believe they will get the required services. 
Senior leaders within enabling services must address this issue by ensuring their functions have the capability of 
a third party external provider. Customers have to work in good faith with the providers to ensure the model is 
implemented in the best way to achieve the agreed outcomes for the enterprise.
We have not had sufficient time to analyse the transactional work being done in Defence. Our experience, as well 
as others we have spoken to, suggest that routine administrative transactions such as travel, accounts payable and 
computer support involve unnecessary dense manual processes and rework. Poor processes have clearly been 
established and inefficiencies abound. Such transactional work, especially when it is poorly done, is a distraction from 
the Defence mission. 
79 Briefing materials provided to the review team as part of the Internal Reform Program analysis.
80 Chief Executive Officer, Defence Materiel Organisation, correspondence to Defence Chief Finance Officer, 24 October 2014.
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Transforming Service Delivery
Consistent with the One Defence model, we recommend that the service delivery reform program, including 
full integration of the current Defence Materiel Organisation corporate functions, be completed. 
We recommend that all corporate services (with the exception of finance but including the Defence 
Security Authority) be consolidated under the Associate Secretary. This would involve:
• Specialist leads (for example human resources, information and communications technology, public affairs and 
communication) providing policy, standards, evaluation and assurance;
• The human resources model doing strategic rather than transactional work as this is central to achieving the 
cultural change required for delivering One Defence. The human resources lead role should define the strategic 
human resources framework for Defence including policies and strategic workforce plans (see Chapter Five). The 
line areas would be responsible for managing their workforce within this framework. Human resources staff should 
have primary accountability to the line managers with links back to the central human resource role; 
• All other enabling areas being connected to the centre but having a structure in place to support their customers 
throughout the department; and
• Transactional services being consolidated and outsourced. Quality assurance systems should be put in place 
to measure the performance of external service providers. Where transactional work remains in house, quality 
assurance systems should also be put in place.
We recommend that all military enabling services (Joint Logistics Command Policy, Joint Health 
Command, Australian Defence College, Australian Civil-Military Centre) be consolidated under a two star 
officer reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force. 
This consolidation under a two star officer will allow the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to focus on the new future 
force and joint responsibilities as well as the military enablers. We are confident that the span of command and 
disparate responsibilities can be appropriately aggregated under a single officer. It is our view that the Joint Health 
position should remain at the regular two star level and the Reserve position should be retained at the reserve  
two star level.
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5
One Defence 
Workforce
Key Recommendation 4
Ensure committed people with the right skills are in appropriate jobs 
to create the One Defence workforce
Overview
The diagram below shows the major elements of Defence’s $29.4 billion budget for 2014–15. Employee expenses 
are estimated at $11.0 billion. Australian Defence Force personnel (a permanent force of more than 57,000) will cost 
$8.8 billion or 30 per cent of the Defence budget. Defence public servants (an enabling workforce of 19,400) will cost 
$2.2 billion or 8 per cent of budget.81 
Diagram 9: Major elements of Defence’s budget
The proportion of employee costs relative to capital and operating costs is strongly influenced by the ebb and flow of 
funding for major capital equipment. For instance, current estimates put employee costs at 37.5 per cent of the budget 
and capital at 32.0 per cent, reflecting government decisions made in previous years to defer capital expenditure. 
However, by 2018–19, employee costs are forecast to fall to 35.0 per cent as deferred capital expenditure resumes. 
The employee, capital and operating costs will and should continue to fluctuate with strategic priorities. The prime 
consideration is whether these proportions reflect the most effective and efficient use of funds to support current and 
future force requirements.
81 Department of Defence, Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2014-15, Canberra, 2015, pp. 21-22.
Major Capital Equipment
$6.0b (20%)
Other Capital Investment
$3.4b (12%)
Operating Costs
$9.0b (30%)
APS Staff
$2.2b (8%)
ADF Members
$8.8b (30%)
Estimated Defence Expenditure 2014-15
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Defence’s enabling workforce
The work of the Navy, Army, Air Force and Joint Operations Command is enabled by a workforce of 23,700 people 
employed mainly in the non-Service groups, including the Defence Materiel Organisation. It comprises 19,400 public 
servants, 4300 Australian Defence Force personnel and 350 employees contracted into Defence. 
The total direct employment cost of Defence’s enabling workforce in 2013–14 was $3 billion. $2.3 billion of this was 
incurred in respect of public servants (approximately $110,000 per employee) with the remaining employee costs 
borne by the Services (approximately $180,000 per Australian Defence Force member). Rates of remuneration are 
illustrated in Diagram 10 which demonstrates that: 
• Including basic allowances, the average annual remuneration of Australian Defence Force personnel is some 30 
per cent higher than the equivalent public servant;82 and
• Defence public servants at the Executive Level 1 level or higher are paid above the national average, as are 
Australian Defence Force personnel at all but the junior ranks.83 
Diagram 10: Australian Public Service and Australian Defence Force equivalents
82 In addition to basic pay, Australian Defence Force members receive allowances in respect of their service as well as assistance with housing and 
health costs, see Department of Defence, Annual Report 2013–14, vol. 2, p. 38, available at <www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/>.
83 The table of APS and ADF equivalent ranks is at Annex F. ADF remuneration in Diagram 10 includes Service and Uniform Allowances only.  
Male Adult Total Average Earnings (the generally accepted wages benchmark) are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat. no. 6302.0, May 
2014, available at <www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6302.0>.
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Significant additional numbers of people are employed by external providers delivering contracted services to 
Defence, including:
• An estimated 27,000 people employed by industry to deliver inputs to capability, including major  
military equipment; and
• Several thousand staff employed by contractors to maintain and secure Defence bases.
Defence’s public servants are the most likely, of all Commonwealth agencies, to have only ever worked in one agency 
(Defence), and the most likely to have been promoted only within Defence. One in four Defence public servants come 
from the Australian Defence Force, on a path of lifetime employment spanning enlistment, Australian Defence Force 
service, movement to the public service and, finally, age retirement. It is a cradle to grave model which is not without 
its benefits. However on balance we would contend that this insular approach and lack of diversity contributes to the 
inability of Defence to change.
Because it has such a large workforce delivering a wide range of services in support of the Australian Defence Force, 
it is vital that Defence drives inefficiency, duplication, redundancy, poor fit for roles and mediocre performance out of 
the organisation.
A plan to deliver a professional workforce
While the Navy, Army and Air Force have detailed workforce plans, Defence does not have a strategic workforce plan 
for its enabling workforce. Without it, Defence struggles to identify skills gaps across the agency and place the right 
people with the right skills in the right roles at the right time to deliver Defence’s mission.
A strategic workforce plan is a necessary prerequisite for building a highly professional workforce with the necessary 
skills and balance of public servants and Australian Defence Force personnel. Defence has made slow progress 
since its first attempt in 2010 to outline overall workforce challenges and opportunities. Some groups have developed 
workforce plans of varying maturity and detail. As recently as 2013, Defence started classifying its enabling staff by 
job family and identifying their learning and development requirements. 
However, on the whole, efforts have been piecemeal, inconsistent and focused on the number of budgeted staff and 
roles, rather than the skills required today and in the future. The fact that Defence does not systematically collect, 
store and update comprehensive information on the skills of its enabling workforce is a major failing. 
As a consequence, Defence lacks the necessary skills to achieve its mission in some areas. Defence leadership has 
recognised this issue and in November 2014, conducted its first assessment of public service workforce skills gaps. 
This highlighted critical shortages in job families such as engineering and technical and project management. A June 
2014 internal audit of the Defence Materiel Organisation’s engineering and technical workforce concluded that:
The state of the Defence Materiel Organisation’s Engineering and Technical workforce is a risk 
to Defence capability. Defence Materiel Organisation has limited visibility of their workforce skills. 
Defence Materiel Organisation has no targeted strategies for attraction and retention of the right skills 
and resources required for future capability. Defence Materiel Organisation has no ability to model 
engineering and technical workforce requirements for the future. It appears that [Defence People 
Group] does not support Defence Materiel Organisation’s strategic workforce management program 
as they do not have clarity from Defence Materiel Organisation on what workforce gaps they have in 
relation to skills, experience, qualifications and diversity.84 
84 Ernst and Young, Internal Audit of the Professionalisation of Engineers (2013/14 No. 6) Final Report, Defence Materiel Organisation, Canberra, 
23 June 2014, p. 5.
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We recommend that, as part of the budget and planning process, Defence build a strategic workforce 
plan for the enabling functions, and incorporate workforce plans for each job family in order to drive 
recruitment, learning and development, performance and talent management. We envisage Defence will 
require professional assistance to complete this large task.
This strategic workforce plan should:
• Be based on job families and functions as they are refined, with lead responsibility allocated to job family sponsors;
• Forecast the supply and demand for particular skills;
• Identify skills surpluses or shortages across the whole organisation and reallocate resources accordingly;
• Incorporate professionalisation plans and skilling maps, especially for critical job families such as strategic policy, 
engineering, maintenance and logistics, procurement and contracting, and program/project management;
• Locate parts of the business in places other than Canberra to help attract the required skills;
• Be informed by a census of the current skills and qualifications of the enabling workforce; and
• Incorporate targets for recruitment, learning and development, talent management and career planning that are 
reported to and tracked by the Defence Committee.
It is imperative that Defence develops this strategic workforce plan and aligns its human resources activities, updating 
these annually to ensure they continue to reflect Defence needs. Combined with the development of effective career paths 
and performance management, the skills and professionalisation of Defence’s enabling workforce will be enhanced. 
The role of Australian Defence Force personnel 
There are 2400 public servants currently assigned to Navy, Army, Air Force and Joint Operations Command, where 
they carry out non-military duties that would otherwise be done by Australian Defence Force personnel. One reason 
for this is because it is cheaper to use public servants than Australian Defence Force personnel. 
Australian Defence Force personnel incur a cost premium. This comes from the extensive support Australian Defence 
Force personnel are provided in order to train for and execute their duties. There are also financial benefits they 
receive in compensation for the arduous nature of those duties and the impact that military life has on their families. 
At almost every rank, Australian Defence Force personnel are more expensive than their public service equivalents. 
Therefore, as a value for money proposition with the efficient use of Commonwealth funds in mind, it makes sense to 
only utilise Australian Defence Force personnel in roles that cannot be done by a public servant.
Currently, there are more than 4300 postings of Australian Defence Force personnel to non-Service groups. This 
costs around $300 million annually over and above what it would cost to fill the roles with public servants. These 
postings are made for three main purposes:
• To bring to bear military specialist knowledge and experience (such as helping develop a proposal for new  
military equipment);
• To train Australian Defence Force personnel in tasks that are necessary for their career development; and
• To provide respite from Australian Defence Force duty (for example, shore duty after being at sea).
We learned that the basis for the numbers of Australian Defence Force personnel posted from each Service are largely 
historical. The numbers of billets in non-Service groups were broadly set some years ago. While some posting billets fill 
the need for specialist skills, most placements are less critical to the effective operation of the enabling workforce.
Typically, Australian Defence Force personnel spend the first year of their posting learning the job, the  
second year-and-a-half performing in the job, and the final six months transitioning to the next job. This relatively 
short rotation adds more inefficiency and cost especially if it is a poor fit for role. 
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In addition to the deleterious impact on the enabling workforce, it begs the question of whether the current posting 
arrangements actually provide best value to the Australian Defence Force, and whether the goals of training and 
respite can be better achieved in some other way.
We recommend that Defence employ Australian Defence Force personnel in non-Service roles only:
• When it is critical to achieving capability; and
• For a minimum of three years to achieve best value for money from the premium paid.
Overlap and redundancy
In the course of this review, we became aware of overlap between the enabling workforce and the Australian Defence 
Force’s own corporate workforce. This workforce is substantial and at April 2014, included 12,800 Australian Defence 
Force personnel delivering corporate functions within the Services.
Specific examples include:
• The total logistics and transport workforce of 5700 people comprises 600 Navy, 1900 Army and 900 Air Force 
staff assigned to movements and logistics, plus 2300 staff in the enabling logistics workforce; 
• A legal workforce of nearly 400, with 150 legal staff spread across the Services and another 240 in the  
enabling workforce;
• 3700 staff in people and human resources-related jobs, of which 2200 are in the enabling workforce and 1500 are 
spread across the Services;
• 190 Army finance and pay officers in addition to the 1400 strong finance workforce in Defence and  
Defence Materiel Organisation; and
• Over 900 administration officers in Army in addition to the 2500 in the enabling workforce.
The incidence and scale of overlap and redundancy (paying 30 per cent more for Australian Defence Force personnel) 
is self-evidently inefficient. A proportion of Australian Defence Force personnel are carrying out tasks that could be 
more cost effectively assigned to a public servant or contractor. 
We recommend that as many functions as possible be performed by public servants or outsourced if they 
are transactional in nature.
There were also instances of overlap within the enabling workforce. We found that:
• the Defence Materiel Organisation had declined to amalgamate its 500 finance people with the 900 finance staff in 
the rest of Defence to reduce duplicated effort, notwithstanding advice that amalgamation carried scant legal risk;
• Navy and Army had re-established capability development units within their headquarters as a response to the 
perceived poor performance of Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation; and
• Joint Capability Coordination and the Chief Information Officer Group were executing overlapping functions 
intended to make military equipment interoperable.
Defence struggles to convince its senior managers and staff to forgo their allegiance to their group or Service and 
instead combine to deliver unified services across the organisation, irrespective of the function. Defence has now 
embarked, for the second time, on a program of reform to deliver shared services toward a common end rather than 
bespoke services within silos (see Chapter 4).
The challenge for Defence’s management is making optimal use of the public service and Australian Defence Force 
workforce, the costs of which are, with important exceptions, largely determined by factors outside the direct control 
of Defence’s senior management.
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Employee costs require careful management
Consistent with the enterprise bargains that have been agreed with Defence’s public servants (in accordance with 
the bargaining framework set by Government from time to time) and the remuneration tribunal decisions that set 
Australian Defence Force pay and conditions, the salary costs of Defence’s public service and military workforce have 
largely kept pace with price inflation over the last five years. However, employee expenses have risen above inflation 
because of:
• ‘Automatic’ performance pay increments for public servants, due largely to the failure of Defence leadership to 
apply the existing performance management framework effectively (discussed later); and
• The rising costs of military health, housing and Fringe Benefits Tax allowances.
Australian Defence Force housing costs rose from $655 million (8.5 per cent of Australian Defence Force employee 
expenses) in 2009–10 to $821 million (9.7 per cent of Australian Defence Force employee expenses) in 2013–14. This 
represents an annual rate of increase of 5.8 per cent per annum, somewhat above the 5.0 per cent experienced by 
the broader community.85 
Allied to this has been a continuing increase in Fringe Benefits Tax paid in respect of Australian Defence Force 
personnel from $298 million to $384 million over the same period (6.5 per cent per annum), mainly for rental and 
housing assistance. Combined, these costs now account for more than 14 per cent of Australian Defence Force 
employee expenses and their growth is accelerating faster than the community norm, for reasons that are not clear. 
Given our limited timeframes, this area requires further examination by Defence.
Of more concern are sharply rising health costs, from $266 million in 2009-10 to $389 million in 2013–14, increasing 
at a rate of 9.9 per cent per annum, more than twice the rate of 4.7 per cent per annum experienced by the general 
community.86 The reasons for this are not well understood and are also of concern for the future management of 
Australian Defence Force workforce costs.
There may be limited scope for Defence to control these costs, which arise as an integral part of the employment 
offer that attracts and retains Australian Defence Force personnel and their families. It does, however, highlight the 
real importance of making the best possible use of the military workforce. It is a priority for Defence leadership to 
revisit and recalibrate practices that detract from efficient use of the Australian Defence Force, including where:
• Australian Defence Force personnel are posted into the enabling workforce;
• Australian Defence Force personnel are executing duties that could, with little modification, be undertaken by 
public servants or contractors; and 
• More efficient use can be made of the posting cycle to reduce the costs of churn. 
We recommend that Defence review the entirety of its enabling and military corporate workforce to 
ensure that it supports the Australian Defence Force with the minimum of overlap and redundancy, and 
with the greatest overall economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
85 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Selected Living Cost Indexes, Australia, Housing costs of employee households, cat. no. 6467.0,  
September 2014, available at <www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/6467.0Main+Features1Sep%202014?OpenDocument>.
86 Ibid., Health costs of employee households, September 2014.
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Defence middle management out of shape
Organisations get out of shape over time if left unattended. As noted in Chapter One, Defence has been drifting and 
has not been reshaped in decades. It is now poorly structured. 
There are up to 12 layers in some parts of the organisation, from the Secretary to his front line staff. More than half 
of all Defence staff are seven or more layers away from their chief manager. This stifles innovation and slows down 
communication, decision-making and execution. No more than six or seven layers of management is common 
practice, even in the largest organisations.87 
Though the management layers are deep, spans of control are surprisingly small for most of Defence’s middle 
managers. There are nearly 2000 managers at the Executive Level 2 equivalent level and they typically supervise three 
or less staff. There are a further 4000 or so staff at the next level down (the equivalent of Executive Level 1) and they 
typically supervise only one or two staff. By way of comparison, the benchmarks for this level have middle managers 
supervising five to eight staff.88
Though Defence’s middle managers are paid well above the community average (see Diagram 10), four out of 
five supervise less than a handful of staff, and almost half of the upper rank of middle managers report to another 
manager of the same rank.
Our analysis has shown that that there is substantial work to be done to ensure proper spans of control across 
all job families. We acknowledge the specialist nature of some work. Defence will always need such specialists — 
linguists, mathematicians, scientists, engineers, cryptographers and cyber-specialists — who should be retained for 
their unique expertise and employment practices will need to recognise this. However, specialists are a small part of 
Defence’s middle management cohort. 
Narrow spans of control in middle management indicate layers of hierarchy and process that weaken innovation, 
empowerment and accountability, and encourage micromanagement and underutilisation. They also result in poor 
career development.
The Defence enabling workforce has also experienced classification creep. The pilot work value review of the 
Capability Development Group of October 2014 found a significant proportion of staff at higher classifications whose 
main duties were more suited to lower classifications.89 Work value reviews continue and early indications are that 
over-classification has occurred in other parts of the enabling workforce.
We conclude that significant change is required to the management and structure of Defence’s enabling workforce 
if it is to operate as an integrated entity maximising public value, delivering Defence policy outcomes to Government 
and supporting the tasks of the Australian Defence Force.
We recommend that Defence:
• Reduce organisational layers;
• Increase the spans of control of managers;
• Align workforce standards in accord with the requirements of the Australian Public Service 
Commission; and
• Engage external assistance to facilitate this work as required.
87 Boston Consulting Group, <http://www.bcg.com/documents/file15242.pdf>.
88 ibid.
89 Briefing materials provided to the review team in September 2014 identified 58 per cent of the Capability Development Group workforce as 
incorrectly classified or allocated to tasks suited to lower classifications.
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High Performance Standards and Fostering Talent
Performance management is a requirement of all managers and employees in the enabling workforce. Staff develop 
annual performance agreements in conjunction with their supervisor; clear goals are to be set and recorded, with 
progress discussed part way through the year and again at the end of the year, when performance is rated. That 
rating determines whether the employee’s salary is increased by the quantum set out in the Defence Enterprise 
Collective Agreement.
This concept and approach is essentially sound, and if properly executed, performance goals should align with 
Defence’s priorities as expressed in the Corporate Plan. However:
• A sample of performance agreements showed that performance goals are not always clear or focused on 
outcomes, nor aligned to outcomes and requirements cascaded down from the Secretary to every level; and
• Hard conversations and decisions are not taking place. Performance assessment data shows that in 2014 less 
than two per cent of staff were rated below satisfactory.
The financial impact has been quantified: over the period 2010–2014, pay increases for pro-forma performance 
assessments have added to each year’s wage bill and now add tens of millions of dollars of expense. The evidence 
shows that Defence has a sound performance management tool at its disposal, but is not using it effectively.
We view this as a failing of leadership and management. Staff need to be informed of priorities, what is to be done, 
why it is necessary and how it contributes to the larger Defence mission. Leaders have to set the example through 
behaviour. Difficult conversations not held are detrimental to the performance of individuals, and to the morale of 
other staff who see pay increases awarded for underperformance.
Failures of leadership are confirmed by recent survey data that show Defence’s public service leadership trailing that 
of the Services and the broader Australian Public Service in key areas.90 There is a disparity between how Defence 
senior leaders see themselves and how they are seen by their subordinates. 
Defence staff reported little confidence in their senior leadership. The leadership was seen as not very effective at 
leading and managing change and did not appear to be held accountable for their performance.91 By contrast, 
Defence senior leadership performance appraisals rated less than one per cent of senior staff as less than effective: 
more than half were rated ‘superior’ and one in eight were rated ‘outstanding’.92 
There are clear grounds for Defence’s leadership to reform and strengthen the performance management system to:
• Introduce clear, outcome-focused accountabilities, cascaded down from the Secretary’s accountabilities and the 
priorities outlined in the Corporate Plan;
• Make it more transparent and apply it consistently with normal distribution techniques being incorporated;
• Recognise and reward high performance and team leadership, including by 360 degree appraisal; and
• Apply real consequences for poor performance generally and not dealing with underperformance.
90 Australian Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2013–14, 2014, available at  
<www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-apsc/parliamentary/state-of-the-service-2013-14>.
91 Analysis of data from Defence’s YourSay Organisational Climate surveys of 2013 and 2014.
92 Data provided by Defence People Group.
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The review team notes that these reforms will support the statutory requirements of the Australian Public Service 
Commission that come into effect on 1 July 2015. It is imperative that the elements we have outlined are incorporated 
as part and parcel of the management of the Defence enabling workforce. We recommend that Defence 
implement a transparent performance management system that is consistently applied, recognises and 
rewards high performance and introduces consequences for underperformance and failure to deal with 
it. An example is shown in Diagram 11 below. We have concluded that external assistance is required for a period to 
catalyse the process and set it on the right path. 
Diagram 11: Performance Management System
The outputs of employees in this performance management system are determined by the enterprise plan, cascaded 
through the organisation. The intended impact of the recommendations is to drive fundamental change to Defence’s 
management and performance culture. 
We recommend that as part of the performance management system, Defence take steps to create a 
culture where leadership, professionalism, and corporate behaviour are valued and rewarded.
Set business model, 
organisation structure 
and accountabilities
Agree 
individual role 
accountabilities
Agree 
individual
performance
goals/outcomes
Ensure individual and 
shared accountabilities 
are specific, measurable, 
outcome-focused, horizontally 
consistent, and cascaded 
from the Secretary to junior staff
Introduce upward 
appraisals for 
Executive Level 1 
to Senior Executive Service 
Band 3 to feed into 
performance potential 
assessment
Recognise outstanding 
people managers who are 
also high-performers in 
their own right
Convene Performance 
Appraisal Review Panels 
• Review proposed staff performance/potential ratings
• Challenge and calibrate rankings to fit forced distribution 
• Agree individual performance implications, 
  especially for underperformers and talent pool
Impose consequences on managers 
who do not deal with underperformers 
• If an employee is rated Not Effective, 
   managers must initiate a Performance Evaluation Process
• If managers do not manage an underperformer, 
   their rating is downgraded 
• Underperforming staff cannot move to another role 
Reward top talent
• Expand current 
   Talent Management Programs
• Introduce talent exchanges 
Track
individual
performance
Assess
individual
performance
Review and 
calibrate 
assessments
Manage 
performance 
implications
Introduce Australian 
Public Service Staff 
assessments against a 
performance/ potential 
matrix with guidelines 
around the distribution 
of results
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
First Principles Review | CREATING ONE DEFENCE62
One Defence 
Optimising Resources and 
Dispelling Myths
6
Key Recommendation 5
Manage staff resources to deliver optimal use of funds and 
maximise efficiencies
This First Principles Review is focused on optimising Defence as an organisation. In line with our first principles we 
have recommended that Defence transform from a disaggregated and complex organisation into one that strongly 
focuses on its core business and outcomes. It must strip back and simplify the unnecessarily complicated processes 
and structures and introduce greater transparency, contestability and professionalism. These transformations 
will inevitably lead to efficiencies. We have identified some efficiencies that will arise if our recommendations are 
comprehensively implemented. 
Measuring Efficiency
There are some commonly used efficiency measures in relation to Defence which are either outdated or misleading 
and not appropriate for measuring the organisation’s performance. Better metrics of efficiencies would draw on 
financial data showing the proportion of funds expended on core functions, outputs or force element. That is, what is 
spent where in order to achieve the required outcomes. 
We recommend that the use of measures such as the teeth-to-tail ratio and the one third budget 
split, should cease for reasons discussed in detail below. In addition, we recommend that appropriate 
efficiency measures are developed which link to the delivery of agreed outcomes. 
Teeth-to-Tail Ratio
The teeth-to-tail ratio is a widely used93 coarse measure of the administrative overhead of military forces. For instance 
the National Commission of Audit argues that, ‘A simpler and leaner structure is a priority … A particular focus should 
be the ratio of the combat force to other personnel (the so called ‘teeth to tail’ ratio). Defence should develop a 
programme to improve this over time.’94 
The National Commission of Audit and other observers interpret higher ratios as indicating a leaner and therefore 
more effective fighting force. However, the fundamental conceptual and methodological shortcomings of the measure 
are such that the opposite can be true. 
The United States of America, for example, reports declining teeth-to-tail ratios as warfare becomes increasingly 
mechanised and its armed forces adopt sophisticated technology. This means that United States forces are 
becoming more effective and efficient as their teeth-to-tail ratio declines.95 The Australian experience is that the ratio 
declines as an effective supply chain grows to support extended periods of operations.
93 See, for instance, S. Gebicke and S. Magid, ‘Lessons from around the world: benchmarking performance in Defence’, McKinsey on 
Government, no. 5, Spring 2010, pp. 4–13; Major General M. Suman, ‘Teeth to Tail Ratio: an archaic concept’, Indian Defence Review, vol. 21(4), 
October–December 2006, pp. 71–75.
94 National Commission of Audit, Towards Responsible Government, The Report of the National Commission of Audit – Phase One,  
February 2014, p. 131, available at <www.ncoa.gov.au>.
95 J.J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations, Combat Studies Institute Press,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007, p. 66.
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The teeth-to-tail ratio, while simple, is an unreliable indicator of the effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force or 
the efficiency of its supporting structures and enabling workforce because:
• The ratio can be varied upward or downward by excluding the intelligence and security workforce from the 
calculations and/or moving other elements of the Australian Defence Force into the tail. The ratio has also declined 
as armed forces have mechanised, adopted new technology and become more effective;
• It can decline when military positions are civilianised, notwithstanding the cost efficiencies achieved to the overall 
benefit of Defence;
• It can decline when the more economical and flexible civilian enabling workforce expands to support the Australian 
Defence Force’s requirements making available a greater proportion of uniformed personnel for duties at the ‘sharp 
end’; and
• It can increase when Defence’s enabling work is transferred to another entity, commercialised or outsourced to 
realise an economic benefit, though the number of people funded for enabling work may not change significantly.96 
One Third Budget Split
Historically, the mix between capital, operating expenses and employee costs has been relatively constant at one 
third each. This seems to be a coincidence rather than any considered strategy or acknowledgement that the one 
third split is the optimal mix of budget expenditure. 
In more recent years, there has been a reduction in the proportion of budget allocated to capital, raising questions 
about the balance between the three budget elements. At a glance it may suggest that increasing personnel costs 
are putting the capital investment budget under pressure (as noted in this review’s Terms of Reference at 3d), but in 
fact this trend has been driven more by volatility in overall funding than by growth in personnel costs.
Diagram 12: Capital spending fell as a proportion of total spending in recent years,  
but is forecast to recover
96 From 1993, the ratio rose as recommendations of the Wrigley Review and the 1991 Force Structure Review were implemented, including 
through the Commercial Support Program, and when Aerospace Technologies of Australia and Australian Defence Industries were privatised. See 
Department of Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, Canberra, pp. 41–45; Department of Defence, Annual Report 1991–92, Canberra, 1992,  
p. 10; Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Funding Australia’s Defence, Canberra, May 1998, pp. 59–60.
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Diagram 13: Overall funding volatility drives capital reductions
Current forecasts suggest that the capital budget will return to approximately one third of the overall budget over the 
forward estimates. However, judging appropriateness and force fitting this alongside an historic ratio is not the right 
approach as it will drive the wrong outcomes. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the employee, capital and operating costs will and should continue to fluctuate with strategic 
priorities. The prime consideration is whether these proportions reflect the most effective and efficient use of funds to 
support current and future force requirements.
Focus on public service workforce 
Both of the measures discussed above are commonly used to draw attention to public servant workforce numbers. 
They are often combined with growing personnel costs, without detailed analysis, to suggest a bloated, overpaid and 
inefficient public service workforce and an ensuing focus on ‘civilian’ reductions as a key efficiency measure. 
As we noted in Chapter 5, the public service workforce equates to eight per cent of the overall Defence budget and 
public servants are, on average, 30 per cent less expensive than military personnel. The focus on setting arbitrary 
targets for public service reductions in Defence does not encourage good business practice. 
The current way public service numbers are managed in Defence drives some perverse behaviour and unintended 
outcomes — the focus on staffing numbers separate from budget allocation is not consistent with how other 
departments manage their budgets. 
At the project level, Defence treats staff as a ‘free good’. Employee costs are not considered part of a project’s costs 
and a manager cannot adjust numbers of staff based on project need. An alternative approach is to manage a total 
project budget that includes employee expenses. This encourages managers to exercise judgement and discretion 
to ‘trade’ within that operating budget (assessing their need for how many staff and what levels, skills and contracted 
expertise are required) to most efficiently and effectively deliver the outcomes required. 
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At the enterprise level, the focus on public service numbers makes it difficult to achieve the most efficient workforce 
mix. While public servants are less expensive than military personnel, the Services are wary about giving up military 
positions because the public servant replacements may be lost via possible future reductions. In fact, they have 
replaced public service staff with military personnel to ensure functions continue. 
If the current practice continues, it will be extremely difficult to implement our recommendations in Chapter 5 
regarding the best workforce mix to match required outcomes. We recommend that the focus on public service 
reductions as the primary efficiency mechanism for Defence cease. We also recommend that Defence 
manage its workforce numbers in line with good resource management practice where Defence is held to 
account for delivering on required outcomes within available resourcing.
Workforce Efficiencies from Implementing One Defence
As noted above, efficiencies were not the primary driver of the review. We debated whether to include numbers 
relating to workforce reductions because arbitrary targets and ranges can be manipulated. Mandating a target at 
the high end of a range or adopting a low end target and doing the bare minimum to achieve it, can easily become 
a distraction to implementation. It has the potential to shift the focus from achieving the overall outcome of the 
recommendations and measuring changes in effectiveness to measuring numbers. 
The critical factor to consider here is that the identified efficiencies are the result of analysis and linked to a specific 
reform initiative. It is about better allocation of resources rather than arbitrary approaches to reductions. 
Downsizing is already occurring within Defence with full time equivalent staff reducing from approximately 22,300 in 
mid-2012 to around 19,500 in October 2014. These reductions have largely been achieved through natural attrition 
and a tightening of recruitment practices. 
Whilst these arbitrary approaches are delivering results, the review team believes a more targeted approach would 
produce more control over the shape and skills of the workforce. 
We have set broad targets and would expect that detailed targets would be developed as part of the implementation 
process, based on more in-depth analysis. It is our view that effective implementation of our recommendations will 
deliver substantial and quantifiable efficiencies. 
Strong strategic centre
In advice to the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force, we have recommended that seven Senior Executive 
Service Band 3 positions and one 3 star position be removed which is a 32 per cent reduction in positions at this 
level. We expect that as part of the implementation process, organisational restructuring will cascade throughout the 
senior leadership group and will necessarily change the shape and reduce the numbers of the leadership group. 
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Capability development life cycle
The creation of the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group will lead to the reduction of around 1000 public 
servants and a reallocation of around 950 Australian Defence Force personnel.97 These suggested reductions 
are consistent with the level of reduction recommended by another third party review of the Defence Materiel 
Organisation.98 These reductions would result from:
• Integration into the Department with a reduction in the number and costs of financial and other transactions 
between Defence and the Defence Materiel Organisation as well as the full implementation of shared  
corporate services;
• Implementing the smart buyer model with associated reduction in the number of System Project Offices and 
appropriate outsourcing to industry (in both acquisition and sustainment); 
• Removing duplicated functions such as industry policy, reform and contestability functions; and
• Using military and public service expertise appropriately. 
Streamlining the two pass process will reduce duplication, project documentation and the time taken to develop such 
material. Removing the current practice of cost slippage as a budgeting rule should improve schedule management 
and enable projects to be delivered within agreed timeframes. Decreasing the bureaucracy, managing costs more 
appropriately and having a tailored, skilled work force will generate significant efficiency for the department.
Middle management spans and layers
Defence’s enabling organisation is significantly out of shape with up to 12 layers in some parts of the organisation, 
from the Secretary to front line staff, and very narrow spans of control (a median of two), particularly in the middle 
management layers of the organisation. Through our recommendations in Chapter 5, we seek to improve the 
structure of the enabling workforce. 
Savings will be generated as spans of control are increased and management roles reduced. This initiative is in line 
with the direction from the Australian Public Service Commission that all departments review their spans of control. 
The Commission has also published guidance on expected spans of control depending on the type of function, all of 
which are higher than the Defence median.99 The majority of these role reductions would come from public service 
middle management (around 650 roles) where the spans of control are the lowest (see Chapter 5), but would also 
include military roles which would be returned to the Services (around 100 roles). 
Roles should be assessed to ensure they are appropriately classified and to ensure that people are delivering a consistent 
standard of work for which they are being remunerated. Methodologies need to be put in place to retain top talent and 
ensure the right people are in the right roles to lift the level of professionalisation within the enabling organisation.
Other areas 
Further long term savings will be realised from service delivery reform, estate disposal, information management 
improvement, decreased duplication, standardisation of services and better procurement and contracting processes 
but, at this stage, the exact numbers have not been quantified.
We note the Commission of Audit’s finding that the staffing levels in Defence Headquarters have grown significantly 
since 1998. Attempts at getting consistent and quality assured data proved difficult, possibly due to varied definitions 
of headquarters and service structures. A lack of appropriate data, and the complexity and level of detail required to 
form a firm view on this issue was beyond the remit of the First Principles Review. 
97 Boston Consulting Group analysis of Defence work force data.
98 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, DMO End State Design Final Report, December 2013.
99 Briefing material prepared by Australian Public Service Commission for Secretaries’ Board, October 2014. 
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We would, however, suggest that this is another opportunity for Defence to find productivity savings. The 
headquarters function needs to be considered in light of the One Defence model being established and the 
changing roles of the senior leadership, particularly the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Service Chiefs. We 
recommend that as part of the implementation process, Defence examine the headquarters functions for 
opportunities to achieve more effective and efficient arrangements. 
Conclusion
As we have noted, staff reductions are already occurring in Defence with further projected reductions in 
future financial years. This report provides a targeted approach to staff reductions based on implementing our 
recommendations, which could lead to a Defence public service workforce within the range of 16,000 to 17,000 full 
time equivalents. The initiatives will also lead to the reallocation of around 1000 Australian Defence Force personnel 
back to the Services, consistent with any findings of the Force Structure Review.
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One Defence 
Implementation
7
Key Recommendation 6
Commence implementation of One Defence recommendations 
immediately with required changes in place within two years
Effective implementation is critical to the success of reform and delivering the transformational change described 
throughout this report will be hard work. The scope of the changes proposed include: reduction and redefinition of 
the senior leadership and their respective authority and accountabilities; comprehensive adjustments to organisational 
structures, systems and processes (especially in the core capability development process); more integrated and 
customer-centric enablers; and, reshaping the workforce, changing the workforce mix, introducing a holistic 
workforce management and a comprehensive performance management system. 
As we stated in Chapter One, our recommendations for creating One Defence are a package which should be 
implemented in their entirety rather than cherry-picked and selectively modified. In combination, the magnitude of the 
proposed changes is comparable to those of the Tange Review — a once-in-a-generation opportunity. 
Change needs to be led, and it will involve a change in behaviours. It will only happen with strong, clear and 
uncompromising leadership from the top (political, civilian and military) supported by energetic, committed and 
professional leadership teams, with external scrutiny for a period of time.
Implementation Approach
Managing transition is often something that is not given sufficient attention. At the outset, Defence needs to 
acknowledge that the changes proposed will be difficult and there will be setbacks that will need to be worked 
through. But Defence must avoid defaulting to further consideration and dissection of the problem. There needs to be 
unwavering commitment to seeing the change through. There must be a dedication to building One Defence  
and to putting the enterprise at the forefront of considerations so that the total offer is of greater value than the sum 
of its parts.
Defence needs to generate reform momentum and move to the One Defence model as quickly as possible. There 
should be a focus on delivering high impact, low cost changes in the immediate term. Substantial change needs to 
happen early that, in effect, pushes Defence to a point of no return on its transformation journey.
While speed in implementation is important, Defence should be given an appropriate period to embed changes at all 
levels, deliver the required outcomes, and assess the impact and need for further reform or adjustment. Therefore, 
we recommend no additional reviews on the organisational issues covered by this Review are imposed on 
Defence, particularly within the early years of implementation. 
Further, it is our view that apart from the Pathway to Change initiatives, this review should reset the reform agenda for 
Defence. We also recommend that past reviews and current reform initiatives should be assessed for currency 
and alignment to the One Defence model. There should be no distractions by other reviews new or historic. 
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Key Milestones 
In accordance with the Terms of Reference, and unlike most previous reviews, we have developed a high level plan to 
act as a guide for implementation. This plan includes proposed key milestones and target deadlines. 
It is important that we provide sufficient clarity to avoid any misinterpretation and wherever possible give Defence a 
head start to mobilising implementation without being so prescriptive as to remove the ownership of change from the 
Defence leadership. The plan sets expectations about the pace with which change should occur and provides advice 
and direction for the development of substantially more detailed implementation plans by the Defence leadership. 
In developing these plans, Defence needs to strike the right balance between delegation to the functional owners 
of the change and centralised control. Central design authority and guidance must be set by the Secretary and the 
Chief of the Defence Force. All subordinate plans must align with this central framework to ensure the One Defence 
outcome is centrally managed and to maintain consistency with intent and outcome. 
Functional managers or work stream leads need to be assigned, with their initial task to be the development of 
specific work stream implementation plans within three months. These work stream plans should be rolled into one 
integrated plan, owned by the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force, which once endorsed, will become the 
baseline against which progress is reported and individuals held accountable.
We have front-end loaded the reforms wherever possible to encourage Defence into rethinking all elements of its 
business and to guard against reverting to the old way of working. Many of the structural and leadership changes 
are scheduled in the first three months. Where it is sensible and achievable, as many of these changes as possible 
should occur immediately to demonstrate leadership commitment to the transformation.
The vast majority of the change should be delivered within two years. We recognise that the scale of change is large 
and complex. However, it is our view that two years is realistic. To plan beyond this would risk loss of momentum and 
change being overtaken by ‘business as usual’ priorities. A tail of activity might run beyond two years, for example 
completing the roll-out of the smart buyer model or finalising estate disposals.
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high level imPlementation Plan
immediate + 3 months +9 months +15 months +24 months
accountabilities  
and delayering
Secretary/Chief of the Defence Force accountabilities 
communicated across Defence (Ministerial directive)
Principles and approach defined for organisational 
redesign to inform detailed plan
Secretary/Chief of the Defence Force direct reports and 
other Band 3 positions created, roles charters agreed 
and appointments initiated
Workstream sponsors and initiative leads appointed, 
teams mobilised
Defence Senior Leadership Group (Band 1/2/3) clarified, 
role charters agreed and appointments initiated
Detailed implementation plan for organisational 
redesign and staff reductions for remainder of Defence 
organisation complete
• Baseline organisational data (e.g. roles, reporting 
lines, comp.) compiled
Surplus Senior Executive Service/Star ranked staff 
identified and expected savings quantified
Executive Level 1/2 level positions clarified with role 
charters and performance agreements, appointments 
initiated and existing organisation re-pointed
Surplus Executive Level 1/2 staff identified and 
expected savings quantified
Full new organisation design complete with 
role charters and performance agreements, all 
appointments commenced (excluding System Project 
Offices - addressed in smart buyer roll-out)
All surplus staff identified and expected  
savings quantified
Workforce aligned to target size
strategic centre
New Defence Committee membership confirmed
Workstream sponsors and initiative leads appointed, 
teams mobilised
Defence Committee, Defence Enterprise Business and 
Investment committees operating
Detailed design and implementation plan developed for 
new strategic centre
• Policy and contestability functions
• Corporate planning 
• Force design (including two pass process)
• Finance functions
• Capability managers
• Draft legislative amendment for consideration  
by parliament 
New functions in strategic centre operating
Defence Investment Plan developed and being 
managed
New approvals process redesigned, all projects 
transferred
Centre led processes for enterprise planning and 
budgeting defined and underway for 2016/17 
Department planning
All existing committees reviewed for fit with  
One Defence and retained or abolished
All roles filled in new strategic centre
New framework for reporting in place
• Agreed outcomes (such as preparedness, new 
capability delivery, enterprise)  
• Financial reporting in place
New financial approval thresholds in place
capability delivery
Appointment process for new Deputy Secretary initiated
Workstream sponsors and initiative leads appointed, 
teams mobilised
Detailed design and implementation plan developed for 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
Defence Science and Technology Organisation: 
value proposition articulated and new engagement 
mechanism up and running
Transition of existing functions into new group - parts 
of Capability Development Group/ Defence Materiel 
Organisation/ Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation/ non-materiel procurement/logistics re-
pointed under new lead
Non-core functions disbanded or shifted to other parts 
of the organisation
Integrated requirements, acquisition and sustainment 
delivery and costing methodologies defined and ready 
for implementation
Smart buyer model agreed – outsourcing, System 
Project Office sequencing and consolidation, target 
benefits set
All projects and System Project Offices operating under 
new delivery and costing methodologies
Smart buyer roll-out complete for high importance/
simple set of System Project Offices. New contract 
structure and System Project Offices roles implemented
Smart buyer rollout completed medium importance/
medium complexity set of System Project Offices
Plan for smart buyer model roll-out for remaining 
System Project Offices agreed
workforce reform
Workstream sponsors and initiative leads appointed, 
teams mobilised
New performance agreements agreed for Senior 
Executive Service/Executive Level 2
Detailed design and implementation plan for new 
workforce system developed
• Performance management
• Strategic workforce management
• Australian Defence Force postings
Confirm/appoint senior accountable officers to build 
skill and competence in key job families
Renegotiate the number, type and length of new 
Australian Defence Force postings that start in 2016
New performance agreements agreed for Executive 
Level 1 and below
Roll-out performance management system for Senior 
Executive Service/ Executive Level 2
Strategic workforce plans for all job families
• Skills audit of current personnel
• Future skill requirements and gaps
• Embedded in human resources plans
Australian Defence Force career plans updated for 
impact of reform
Roll-out of performance management system to all of 
Defence Australian Public Service completed – bell curve 
distribution for performance and performance managed
Renegotiate the number, type and length of new 
Australian Defence Force postings starting in 2017 
based on Strategic Workforce Plan
First report of progress against the strategic workforce 
plans prepared
enabling services
Defence Materiel Organisation corporate services 
shifted to centralised, shared service
Workstream sponsors and initiative leads appointed, 
teams mobilised
Interim plan for Estate consolidation developed, 
including a definition of need and identifying first 
tranche disposals
Detailed design and implementation plan for 
Information Management developed, including 
alignment of existing/planned initiatives to Information 
Management agenda
Design and service offers by service delivery  
function completed
Detailed design and implementation plan for Estate 
consolidation developed
First tranche disposals – initial transactions in market
Enterprise Information Management business 
requirements compiled
C4ISR authority in place
Regional service delivery model completed
Second tranche of estate disposals in the market
Information management architecture, standards, 
master data management in place
Service delivery reform completed
Third tranche of estate disposals in the market
First tranche of Information Management initiatives 
implemented and systems and/or applications 
decommissioned
One Defence program
External Oversight Board appointed by Minister
Program governance and implementation office in place
Communication with wider Defence, unions and key 
stakeholders on program impacts underway
Overall plan including target outcomes reviewed by 
External Oversight Board and reported to the Minister
Keep/stop/review for existing reforms completed
Undertake an independent health check on progress
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Governance 
A strong governance and assurance framework is necessary to ensure the successful creation of One Defence and 
to provide visibility of the progress in implementation to the Minister and Government.
We recommend establishing an Oversight Board to provide close external scrutiny, advice on 
implementation progress and regular reports to the Minister. It will be an important source of independent 
advice to the Minister and a key component of ensuring the One Defence outcomes, as envisaged by the review 
team, are delivered. We believe there is benefit in having a mixed membership that includes some members of the 
First Principles Review team.
In accordance with the Terms of Reference, we recommend the Minister, with input from the Department and 
the Oversight Board, report progress on implementation to the Government in March 2016 and March 2017.
Defence will need to establish a highly skilled transition team using a combination of in-house and contracted 
expertise. This team will provide strong central design authority to ensure alignment with the One Defence model 
and review achievement of outcomes. 
Diagram 14: Governance Structure
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Behavioural Shift
Many of the recommendations in this report are about changes to organisational structure and processes (the 
physical mechanisms). Underlying these changes though is the need for a behavioural shift in order to give true effect 
to the One Defence system. Behavioural elements include ‘the attitudes, belief systems and core values that drive 
behaviour and guide daily activities and decision-making throughout the institution’.100
Changes to structure and processes will not of themselves change behaviours. This is part of the implementation 
challenge for the Defence leadership and will require close monitoring. It will be difficult and there will be setbacks 
but there must be consistent pursuit of the new model — the new good. Leaders at all levels will need to be actively 
engaged with the change. Any pockets of resistance must be dealt with quickly.
Leadership
To say this transformational change needs to be led from the top is an understatement. Ultimate accountability for 
implementation of One Defence rests with the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force, but they must be 
supported fully by the Associate Secretary and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Defence senior leadership 
group more broadly.
The transformation must be centrally driven, but locally delivered. The right balance between central control and 
direction, and line management autonomy and expertise is critical. The strong, strategic centre (as discussed 
in Chapter Two) must set a clear framework and direction for moving to One Defence. Within this construct, 
the enterprise planning process should be used to review overall progress and individual leaders should be held 
accountable through their performance agreements and an appropriate performance review framework. 
We have noted that the organisational drift has been partly caused by leadership churn. To prevent continuing drift 
and to provide the greatest chance of implementation success there should be, as much as is realistically possible, 
minimal leadership turnover. The leadership team needs constancy and unity in order to tackle Defence’s problem 
of inertia and make the bulk of the changes within two years. We recommend stability in the key leadership 
positions, particularly over the next two years to provide consistency of direction and ownership of  
the change.
As noted in the Foreword, the One Defence transformation is an opportunity for Defence to establish better 
relationships with the Government, Ministers, external stakeholders, central agencies, its own leadership and 
workforce. It is an opportunity for Defence to reset its reputation and re-position Defence as a truly integrated agency 
that consistently produces the best public value, and is able to meet the current and future demands on it. Most 
importantly, it will allow Defence to effectively deliver on its primary focus: to protect and advance Australia’s strategic 
interests through the provision of appropriately prepared and equipped armed forces.
100 Protiviti, Establishing and nurturing an effective risk culture, 2010, p.14, available at <www.protiviti.com/en-US/Pages/Whitepapers.aspx>.
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Annex A: Terms of Reference including alignment with recommendations
FIRST PRINCIPLES REVIEW OF DEFENCE
Terms of Reference
The First Principles Review of Defence will:
1. ensure that the Department of Defence’s business structures support the ADFs principal tasks, as determined 
by the 2015 Defence White Paper, and other whole of government responsibilities out to 2030;
2. ensure a commercially astute, focused and accountable materiel acquisition and sustainment capability; 
3. improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Defence; 
4. guide the implementation of recommendations from the Commission of Audit not otherwise covered above; 
and,
5. ensure the ongoing delivery and reporting of agreed recommendations.
Issues for Consideration
In addition to any issues the review team considers important to examine in addressing the Terms of Reference, the 
Review team should also consider the following matters:
1. Ensure that the Department of Defence’s business structures support the ADFs principal tasks, as determined 
by the 2015 Defence White Paper, and other whole of government responsibilities out to 2030, including by:
a) Reviewing the cost, efficiency, timeliness and appropriateness of Defence’s current business model and 
processes, including compliance with external processes and responsiveness to Government, with an aim to 
simplify and improve accountability; 
b) Reviewing the capacity of Defence to develop strategy and key policy options, particularly, future White 
Papers, Force Structure and prioritisation of capability investment;
c) Examining the efficient arrangements of the intelligence functions, particularly those involving geospatial 
intelligence; and
d) Examining the functioning of the separate and shared responsibilities and accountabilities of the Secretary 
and Chief of Defence Force.
2. Ensure a commercially astute and focused materiel acquisition and sustainment capability, including by:
a) Examining the benefits and costs of the following three approaches to reforming the Defence Materiel 
Organisation (DMO) and recommending a preferred option and how it should be implemented:
i) Current model with improvements to commercial skills and improved arrangements to manage larger 
and more complex projects;
ii) DMO to be re-integrated into Defence with a focus on contract management, as recommended by the 
Commission of Audit; and
iii) An independent and commercialised DMO in whole or in part.
b) Either as part of 2a, or separately, undertake an examination of specific initiatives to improve business 
processes including, but not limited, to the following:
i) Options to further improve the professional knowledge and skills within the capability development 
function, particularly program and project management, systems engineering and cost and schedule 
estimation (particularly at DCP entry);
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ii) Options to provide greater assurance to Government on the capital and sustainment costs and schedule 
of large complex capabilities including utilising relevant private sector experience;
iii) Options to significantly accelerate the capability development process, including examination of whole of 
government issues and risk based approaches;
iv) How Defence sustains and supports capabilities and extending lessons from the Coles review across all 
areas of sustainment;
v) Options for improved project control particularly through the mandatory use of Earned Value 
Management for all elements of projects that meet an appropriate threshold; and
vi) Opportunities for improved certainty in program-level cash flow estimation, project and program level 
funding arrangements for DMO and alternatives to the use of over-programming as a management tool 
in the DCP.
3. Recommend further options to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Defence by:
a) Assisting Defence to develop appropriate implementation plans, including appropriate benefits realisation 
plans, to deliver agreed outcomes of the Commission of Audit and the First Principles Review, to be followed 
by a progress review in March 2016 to measure the effectiveness of the implementation of  
the recommendations;
b) Developing recommendations for the further rationalisation of IT systems, particularly financial and personnel, 
and further clarify accountability for them and their cost effectiveness; 
c) Examine and recommend options for reaching and maintaining a sustainable balance between Defence’s 
personnel, operating and capability budgets;
d) In the above context, specifically consider what can be done about rising personnel costs, particularly for the 
ADF, that are putting the capital investment budget under significant pressure;
e) Examine outstanding recommendations from other reviews and make recommendations on whether they 
might be retired or re-invigorated; and
f) Recommend further options for the enhanced commercialization of Defence functions, including DSTO but 
excluding DHA.
4. Recommendations from the Commission of Audit not otherwise covered above.
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COMMISSION OF AuDIT
Recommendation 24: Defence
Ensuring the nation’s defence and security is a core function of the Commonwealth Government. The Commission 
recommends a number of steps be taken to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of 
Defence spending through:
a. ensuring preparation of the new Defence White Paper identifies capability options and associated costs for 
different sets of strategic risks. As part of this process, the Government should also assess the balance of 
strategic and fiscal priorities and how this compares with the commitment to increase Defence expenditure to 
two per cent of GDP within a decade;
b. as a pre-condition for setting any new funding profile for Defence under the White Paper, the Government 
should ensure that Defence improves the effectiveness and transparency of expenditure by improving Defence 
budget arrangements and governance, capability development and delivery;
c. transparency and control for government should be significantly improved by stronger budget processes 
including through the Expenditure Review Committee. For new capital, in particular new equipment projects, this 
would include holding funds in separate budget allocations and releasing them as projects are approved. Such 
expenditure should be treated as administered funding rather than departmental funding, so that there is greater 
financial control and scrutiny of this expenditure through established budget processes;
d. a new ministerial directive to the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force 
specifying their separate and shared responsibilities and holding them individually accountable for Defence 
performance;
e. reintegrating the Defence Materiel Organisation into the Department of Defence, with the size of the Defence 
Materiel Organisation being significantly reduced and with a renewed focus on contract management as 
opposed to project management;
f. establishing a more professional Capability Development Group within Defence with an increased use of project 
development professionals skilled in cost and risk assessment;
g. reducing the staffing size of Defence headquarters in Canberra, including senior staff, to 1998 levels; and
h. Defence publishing performance indicators that reveal progress with reform, including the ‘teeth to tail’ ratio and 
the additional cost of unique and Australian built procurement decisions.
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Annex B: Framework for the First Principles Review of Defence
Chapter 7 | One Defence Implementation 89
First Principles Review | CREATING ONE DEFENCE90
Annex C: Recurring themes identified in recent reviews
The recurring themes have been identified in the recent, significant reviews of the Australian Defence Force and the 
Department of Defence cited below:
• McIntosh, Malcolm, et al., Future Directions for the Management of Australia’s Defence - Report of the Defence 
Efficiency Review, Canberra, March 1997—referred to as the Defence Efficiency Review;
• Department of Defence, Report on Defence Governance, Acquisition and Support (prepared by KPMG), Canberra, 
April 2000—referred to as Defence Governance, Acquisition and Support;
• Proust, Elizabeth, et al., Report of the Defence Management Review, Canberra, March 2007—referred to as the 
Proust Review;
• Kinnaird, Malcolm, et al., Defence Procurement Review 2003, Canberra, August 2003—referred to as the  
Kinnaird Review;
• Mortimer, David, Going to the Next Level – the report of the Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review, 
Canberra, September 2008—referred to as the Mortimer Review;
• Pappas, George, 2008 Audit of the Defence Budget, Canberra, April 2009—referred to as the  
Pappas Review;
• Black, Rufus, Review of the Defence Accountability Framework, Canberra, January 2011—referred to as the  
Black Review;
• Rizzo, Paul, Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management Practices, July 2011—referred to as the  
Rizzo Review;
• Department of Defence, Review of Shared Services in Defence (prepared by McKinsey and Company), Canberra, 
July 2011—referred to as Shared Services;
• Broderick, Elizabeth, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force - Phase 2 Report, 
Canberra, August 2012—referred to as the Broderick Review; and
• Coles, John, e al., Study into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability, 
Canberra, November 2012—referred to as the Coles Review.
The table overleaf is adapted from that on pages 86 to 88 of the Australian National Audit Office’s October 2013 audit 
report Capability Development Reform, and sets out recurring themes relating to the capability development and delivery 
process. A more general timeline of reviews of the Defence portfolio since 1970 is presented on the following page.
 
Chapter 7 | One Defence Implementation 91
APRIL 2000 
DEFENCE 
GOVERNANCE, 
ACquISITION 
AND SuPPORT
AuG. 2003 
KINNAIRD 
REVIEW
SEPT. 2008 
MORTIMER 
REVIEW
APRIL 2009 
PAPPAS 
REVIEW
JAN. 2011 
BLACK 
REVIEW
Turnover of capability  
development staff
High turnover of capability development staff prevents the development of skills and 
experience necessary in such a complex and specialist area.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Chronic and critical shortage of 
skills essential to develop robust major 
capability proposals
Cost estimation is a technical discipline and requires specialist skills. High levels of skill are 
critical to delivering capability and making accurate cost estimates that enable informed 
capability/cost decisions. Capability Defence Group personnel (both cost estimators and Desk 
Officers—now known as ‘project managers’) have low average cost-estimating experience. 
Cost estimates must reflect whole-of-life costs.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Initial entry of a project into the 
Defence Capability Plan warrants 
close attention. The Defence 
Capability Plan should be realistic, 
affordable, prioritised and consistent 
with government expectations.
Underestimation of the cost of new equipment specified in the Defence Capability Plan and of 
the associated operating costs, and lack of prioritisation of Defence Capability Plan projects. 
Over-programming and over-planning, which include both including more projects in the 
Defence Capability Plan than Defence can afford and starting more projects than required, to 
accommodate potential schedule slippage in projects.
✘ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lack of independent scrutiny of 
proposals undermines quality.
Absence of scrutiny of capital investment proposals to assess affordability, schedule risk 
and commercial aspects of acquisition by staff who are organisationally independent of the 
proposal sponsor. 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Technical risk is critical and should be 
clearly and consistently assessed and 
communicated to government.
Technical risk is a major factor in the acquisition of new defence capabilities. It is the major 
cause of both post-approval project slippage and cost escalation.
✘ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Acquisition decisions should be 
based on a comprehensive whole-
of-life cost estimate.
Understanding whole-of-life costs is essential to effective decision-making on capability 
options. Inadequate attention given to managing and costing defence capabilities on a whole-
of-life basis results in funding shortfalls for ongoing operating, maintenance and support costs.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Effective information systems that 
provide cost information for major 
capabilities
Defence systems cannot readily provide consistent, reliable or complete information of the 
operating cost of current capabilities. Incomplete cost information about current capabilities 
prevents Defence from making reliable fact-based estimates of future operating costs, and 
means estimates of those costs are based on general assumptions rather than reliable 
historical data on cost drivers.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Rigorous analysis of costs and 
risks associated with requirements 
set beyond those of off-the-shelf 
equipment
Requirements beyond off-the-shelf equipment generate what Mortimer described as 
‘disproportionately large increases to the cost, schedule and risk of projects’ and therefore 
should be based on ‘a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of additional capability sought against 
the cost and risk of doing so’. This analysis must be clearly communicated to government. 
Each and every decision to pursue a unique Australian solution needs to be made with a full 
understanding of not just the benefits but also the extra cost and risk of doing so.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Committees and accountability Too many committees with too many members; representational in nature rather than limited 
to those essential to provide informed advice to accountable decision-makers; features 
of committees result in dissipated accountability and responsibility; improved committee 
processes required.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Annex D: Growth in Defence senior leadership numbers 
Changes to Defence’s top-structure June 1998 to June 2014, based on headcount data
1998 2014 CHANGE
3 star 4 7 75% increase
2 star 25 44 76% increase
1 star 83 149 80% increase
All star ranked 112 200 79% increase
Australian Defence Force other ranks 55,062 56,836 3% increase
Australian Defence Force other ranks per  
star-ranked officer
492 284 -42% decrease
Senior Executive Service 3 7 13 86% increase
Senior Executive Service 2 27 51 89% increase
Senior Executive Service 1 53 110 108% increase
All Senior Executive Service 87 174 100% increase
non- Senior Executive Service Australian Public Service 17,856 21,020 18% increase
other Australian Public Service per Senior Executive 
Service
205 121 -41% decrease
Senior leaders 201 374 86% increase
Other staff 72,918 77,856 7% increase
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Annex E: Capability Development Life Cycle
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Annex F: Australian Public Service classifications and Australian Defence 
Force equivalent ranks
AuSTRALIAN 
PuBLIC SERVICE 
CLASSIFICATION
ARMy RANK ROyAL 
AuSTRALIAN 
NAVy RANK
ROyAL 
AuSTRALIAN AIR 
FORCE RANK
AuSTRALIAN 
DEFENCE FORCE 
EquIVALENT 
RANK 
Australian Public Service 1 
Private Seaman Aircraftman E00 E01 E02
Able Seaman Leading Aircraftman E03 
Lance Corporal E04
Australian Public Service 2 Corporal Leading Seaman Corporal E05
Australian Public Service 3 
Sergeant Petty Officer Sergeant E06
Staff Sergeant E07
Australian Public Service 4
Warrant Officer, Class 2 Chief Petty Officer Flight Sergeant E08
Officer Cadet Officer Cadet Midshipman O00
Warrant Officer, Class 1 Warrant Officer Warrant Officer E09 E10
2nd Lieutenant Acting Sub Lieutenant Pilot Officer O01 
Lieutenant Sub Lieutenant Flying Officer O02
Australian Public Service 5 Captain Lieutenant Flight Lieutenant O03
Australian Public Service 6 Major Lieutenant Commander Squadron Leader O04
Executive Level 1 Lieutenant Colonel Commander Wing Commander O05
Executive Level 2 Colonel Captain Group Captain O06
Senior Executive Service 
Band 1
Brigadier Commodore Air Commodore O07
Senior Executive Service 
Band 2
Major General Rear Admiral Air Vice Marshal O08
Senior Executive Service 
Band 3
Lieutenant General Vice Admiral Air Marshal O09
Secretary General Admiral Air Chief Marshal O10
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Annex G: List of stakeholder interviews
Current and previous members of Parliament
Darren Chester Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence
Jason Clare Former Minister for Defence Materiel and Science
Greg Combet Former Minister for Defence Materiel and Science
Stephen Conroy Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate
Mathias Cormann Minister for Finance
John Faulkner Former Minister for Defence
David Fawcett Senator for South Australia
David Feeney Former Parliamentary Secretary for Defence
John Howard Former Prime Minister
David Johnston Former Minister for Defence
Mike Kelly Office of the Leader of the Opposition
Grant Lovett Office of the Treasurer
Brendan Nelson Former Minister for Defence
Stuart Robert Assistant Minister for Defence
Andrew Shearer Office of the Prime Minister
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade
Departments and Agencies
Elizabeth Broderick Sex Discrimination Commissioner
Megan Clarke Former Chief Executive CSIRO
Allan Gygnell Former Director Office of National Assessments
Jane Halton Secretary Department of Finance
Chris Jordon Commissioner of Taxation
Simon Lewis Secretary Department of Veteran Affairs
Ian McPhee Auditor-General
Martin Parkinson Former Secretary Department of the Treasury
Michael Pezzullo Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection
Steve Sedgwick Former Commissioner Australian Public Service Commission
Michael Thawley Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Ian Watt Former Secretary Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
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Academia and the community
Ross Babbage Professor
Paul Dibb Emeritus Professor, Australian National University
Alan Dupont Professor of International Security, University of New South Wales
Peter Høj Vice-Chancellor, University of Queensland
Neil James Executive Director, Australian Defence Association
Mark Thompson Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Hugh White Professor of Strategic Studies, Australian National University
John White Winter/White AWD Report 
united Kingdom
Paul Blakiston Director Future Defence Equipment and Support Model
Simon Bollom Chief of Material (Air)
Vicki Brookes Head Defence Reform Unit
Barry Burton Head of Commercial (Defence Equipment and Support)
Chris Deverell Chief of Material (Land)
Bernard Gray Chief of Defence Material
Simon Cholerton Operations Director (United Kingdom Trade and Industry)
Stephen Hillier Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Capability)
Will Jessett Director Strategy and Planning
Peter Levene Chair, Defence Reform Group
Tom McKane Former Director General Strategy
Jonathan Slater Director General Head Office and Commissioning Services
David Williams Director General, Finance
Pete Worrall Chief of Material (Joint Enablers)
Annex G: List of stakeholder interviews (Continued)
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Industry and unions
Australian Submarine Corporation
Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union
BAE Systems
Bechtel Corporation
Boeing Company
Community and Public Sector Union
Dyncorp International
Ernst and Young
Hans J Ohff
Jacobs Engineering Group
KBR Incorporated
KPMG
LEK Consulting
Lockheed Martin
The May Group
Noetic Group
Northrop Grumman Corporation
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Professionals Australia
QinetiQ Group
Raytheon Company
Strategy&
Teekay Shipping
Thales Group
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Department of Defence – (Current and former)
Marc Ablong First Assistant Secretary White Paper
Timothy Barrett Chief of Navy
Peter Baxter Deputy Secretary Strategy
Mark Binskin Chief of the Defence Force
Geoffrey Brown Chief of Air Force
John Caligari Chief of Capability Development Group
Chris Deeble Program Manager Joint Strike Fighter
Harry Dunstall General Manager Commercial
Maria Fernandez Director Australian Geospatial Organisation
Patrick Fitzpatrick Director General Maritime Acquisition
Mike Gibson First Assistant Secretary Capability Investment and Resources
David Gould General Manager Submarines
Justine Greig Director General People Strategy and Culture
Ray Griggs Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Steve Grzeskowiak Deputy Secretary Defence Support and Reform
Stephen Gumley Former CEO Defence Materiel Organisation
Allan Hawke Former Secretary, Department of Defence
Neil Hart Co-lead Force Structure Review Team
Tony Hindmarsh Head Defence Materiel Organisation Reform
Angus Houston Former Chief of the Defence Force
David Hurley Former Chief of the Defence Force
David Johnston Chief of Joint Operations
Peter Jones Former Chief Capability Development Group
Michelle Kelly Head Defence Industry Division
Warren King Chief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation
Peter Lawrence Chief Information Officer
Duncan Lewis Former Secretary, Department of Defence
Ed Louis Director General Independent Project Performance Office
Kate Louis Assistant Secretary White Paper Enterprise Management
Carmel McGregor Former Deputy Secretary Defence People
Shireane McKinnie General Manager Joint, Systems and Air
Annex G: List of stakeholder interviews (Continued)
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Department of Defence – (Current and former)
Paul McLachlan Head Land Systems
Steve Meekin Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security
David Morrison Chief of Army
Terry Oldfield Director Gate Reviews
Richard Oliver Head People Policy and Culture
Leisl O’Meara General Counsel, Defence Materiel Organisation
Neil Orme Co-lead Force Structure Review Team
Phillip Prior Chief Finance Officer
Dennis Richardson Secretary of Defence
Brendan Sargeant Chief Operating Officer 
Rebecca Skinner Deputy Secretary Defence People
Ric Smith Former Secretary Department of Defence
Colin Thorne General Manager Land and Maritime
Nick Warner Former Secretary Department of Defence
Steve Wearn Chief Finance Officer Defence Materiel Organisation
Adrian Wellspring Director APS Career Development and Talent Management
Alex Zelinsky Chief Defence Scientist
Defence Boards and Advisory Committees
Ian Chubb Defence Science and Technology Advisory Board
Catherine Fox Gender Equality Advisory Board
Michael L’Estrange Defence Science and Technology Advisory Board
Frank Lewincamp Independent Project Performance Office
Julie McKay Gender Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force
Ralph Neumann Independent Project Performance Office
Paul Rizzo Chair, Defence Audit and Risk Committee
Intelligence and Security Round Table
Materiel Audit and Risk Committee
White Paper Panel
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Public Submissions
84 public submissions were received. 17 met the editorial guidelines for publication and included submissions from 
the following interested people, unions and industry:
• Mr Phil Andrews
• Mr Bob Williams
• Mr Chris Donald 
• Mr Phil Andrews
• Mr Warren Canning
• Accenture
• Australian Academy of Technological Sciences & Engineering 
• Australian Business Defence Industry 
• Australian Industry & Defence Network
• Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union
• BAE Systems 
• Community and Public Sector Union 
• Jacobs Australia 
• Kiah Consulting 
• QinetiQ Australia 
• Royal United Services Institute
• The Returned and Services League of Australia 
Annex G: List of stakeholder interviews (Continued)
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Annex H: Departmental Secretariat
Our sincere thanks to the following members of the departmental secretariat:
Roxanne Kelley Head Reform and Corporate Services
Paul Symon Military Officer First Principles Review
Shannon Frazer Assistant Secretary Enterprise Reform
Jacob Boyle Director First Principles Review (Governance and accountabilities)
Kim Bond Director First Principles Review (Enablers and workforce)
Jarrod Howard Director First Principles Review (Capability Development)
Theresa Coxon Director First Principles Review (Communications)
Anita Misic Executive Officer
Phoebe Jenkins Executive Assistant
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